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ABSTRACT 
 
A  persistent  and  very  high-income  inequality  is  a  well  known  feature  of  the  Brazilian 
economy. However, from 2001 to 2005 the Gini index presented an unprecedented fall of 4.6 
percent  combined  with  significant  poverty  reduction.  Previous  studies  using  partial 
equilibrium  analysis  have  pointed  out  the  importance  of  federal  government  transfer 
programs in this inequality reduction. The aim of this research is to evaluate the efficiency of 
the two most important cash transfer programs, “Bolsa Família” and “BPC”, in achieving their 
purpose  of  alleviating  poverty  and  reducing  the  inequality  in  Brazil’s  income  distribution 
using an integrated modeling approach, the CGE-MS model. The simulation results confirm 
the importance of these programs in reducing inequality from 2003 to 2005. However, the 
effect on poverty alleviation was not strong. Finally, the methodological approach allows the 
identification  of  some  important  economic  facts  that  were  not  presented  in  previous 
analyses, such as the issue of taxation structure that finances these policies. 
 
Key  words:  computable  general  equilibrium  model,  microsimulation  model,  income 
distribution, cash transfer program, fiscal policy, Brazil. 
 

























Acknowledgements: This work was carried out with financial and scientific support from the 
Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) Research Network, which is financed by the Australian 
Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Government of Canada through the 
International  Development  Research  Centre  (IDRC)  and  the  Canadian  International 
Development Agency (CIDA).    1 
1. Introduction  
It is widely known that the Brazilian economy has historically presented one of the most unequal 
income distributions in the world, with a Gini index around 0.60 until the beginning of this decade.
1 It 
is also known that inequality in income distribution is the main determinant of the country’s high 
poverty level, being that the average income level of a secondary determinant (that is, the poverty 
level) does not decline significantly when the country grows because the income gains are very 
unequally distributed, and as such is mostly appropriated by non-poor families (Barros et al, 2001). 
According to Barros et al (2007b), without changes in income inequality, the country should have 
presented  a  balanced  growth  of  14.5  percent  and  22  percent  to  achieve  the  same  observed 
reductions of poverty and extreme poverty levels, respectively, from 2001 to 2005. They also show 
that each decline of 1 percent in the inequality degree (Gini index) has the same impact on the 
poverty  and  extreme  poverty  levels  as  balanced  growth  rates  of  2.4  percent  and  4.0  percent, 
respectively.  Thus,  falls  in  income  inequality  have  stronger  effects  on  poverty  than  economic 
growth. 
In addition to high inequality in income distribution, Brazil also manifests significant levels of 
poverty and severe poverty. In 2005, around 34.1 percent (or 60 million) and 13.2 percent (or 23 
million) of the Brazilian population were, respectively, poor and extremely poor (Barros et al, 2007b). 
Due to the historically unequal income distribution and the very large number of people in poverty 
and  extreme  poverty,  the  Federal  Government  has  been  providing  income  to  these  people  by 
means of transfer programs as a broad poverty alleviation strategy. 
There  are  many  kinds  of  income  transfer  programs  in  Brazil,  such  as  Bolsa  Família  (BF), 
Benefício  de  Prestação  Continuada  (BPC),  several  retirement  benefits  and  pensions,  Abono 
PIS/PASEP  and  Salário  Família.  This  research  analyzes  the  first  two  programs  (BF  and  BCP) 
because they are the main cash transfer programs specifically designed as social policies with the 
purpose  of  poverty  (and  inequality)  reduction,  and  both  programs  have  called  the  attention  of 
several research from different scientific fields. In the next two paragraphs we present a summary of 
the characteristics of these programs (their full description and data are presented in Appendix D). 
Benefício de Prestação Continuada is a social assistance benefit guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution of 1988 and has been implemented since 1996. This benefit aims to aid the elderly who 
are  not  included  in  the  public  social  security  system  and  the  disabled  who  cannot  support 
themselves despite their families’ financial care. Both beneficiary groups comprise 2.9 million of 
Brazil’s current population, with government expending a budget of R$ 11.63 billion (or 0.5% of 
GDP) for BPC in 2006. The benefit consists of a cash transfer amounting to one minimum wage (R$ 
                                                       
1 See Barros et al. (2007a) and Hoffmann (2006a) for more details.   2 
415), and the beneficiary’s family per capita income must be less than a quarter of the minimum 
wage.  
The  Bolsa  Família  program  was  created  in  October  2003  and  is  presently  the  federal 
government’s main transfer program. It is a consolidation of four other former programs that were 
already existing: Bolsa Escola (since 2001), Bolsa Alimentação (since September 2001), Auxílio 
Gás (since December 2001), and Cartão Alimentação (since 2003). Since then, the program has 
been expanded to incorporate new beneficiary groups. Bolsa Família is directed towards extremely 
poor and poor families with a household per capita income under R$ 120 in 2008. The families 
receive a transfer of R$ 62 and a variable amount of R$ 20 per child with a maximum of R$ 60 (or 
three occurrences); hence, the full benefit is placed at R$ 122.  
Unlike the BPC, Bolsa Família is a conditional cash transfer program and requires the fulfillment 
of some requirements for the benefit concession, like 85 percent school attendance for children in 
schooling age, the actualization of vaccination for children under six years old, and regular visits to 
the health center for both pregnant and breastfeeding women. In 2007, Bolsa Família had a total of 
11,048,348 beneficiary families and R$ 9.26 billion worth of transfers (equivalent to 0.4% of GDP).  
Despite the historical stability presented by the inequality in income distribution in Brazil, recent 
studies show empirical evidence that this inequality has declined in an expressive, accelerated and 
continuous way from 2001 to 2005, as shown in the chart below. 





























































































































Source: Barros et al. (2007a)  3 
Recent  studies  also  show  that  the  Bolsa  Família  and  BPC  income  transfer  programs  have 
played an important role in this process. At one point, 22.9 percent of the decline in the inequality of 
income distribution was due to the implementation and enhancement of these programs. 
While in 2001 the Gini index was close to its average value for the last 30 years (0.592), in 2005 
it achieved its lowest magnitude. According to Barros et al (2007a), from 2001 to 2005, the Gini 
index value declined from 0.593 to 0.566, corresponding to a 4.6 percent reduction in the inequality 
degree. This inequality is the main determinant of poverty in Brazil, yet we should also expect that 
its reduction has caused a similar effect in the country’s poverty level. Barros et al (2007b) reports 
that the reduction of inequality in Brazil’s income distribution from 2001 to 2005 induced declines in 
the poverty and the extreme poverty levels of around 3.3 and 2.7 percentage points, respectively. 
Once  the  poverty  and  extreme  poverty  levels  decreased  by  4.6  and  3.4  percentage  points, 
respectively, the fall in the inequality had respectively caused 73 percent and 80 percent of these 
reductions. 
To add, the more immediate impacts of these programs on income distribution and poverty point 
towards better perspectives, as stressed by UNDP (2006, p. 272): 
“The good news is that extreme inequality is not an immutable fact of life. ...a large 
social welfare program - “Bolsa Família” - has provided financial transfers to 7 million 
families living in extreme or moderate poverty to support nutrition, health and education, 
creating benefits today and assets for the future.”
2 
Considering the existing information on inequality in income distribution for 124 countries, almost 
95 percent of these present an income distribution less concentrated than the Brazilian   experience 
(Barros et al, 2006; Hoffmann, 2006a; and UNDP, 2006).  
Once there are different programs, resources should be primarily allocated to those that have 
stronger impacts in terms of poverty and income inequality reduction,
3 hence the need for assessing 
program effects. In order to do this, some researchers use the methodology of comparing program 
participants (the treatment group) with a control group of people with similar characteristics that are 
relevant to program participation; that is, they run counterfactual simulations whose construction 
determines the evaluation design. These evaluation designs can be classified into two categories: 
experimental and quasi-experimental. Both evaluations vary in feasibility, cost, and the degree of 
clarity and validity of results (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003). 
Experimental control designs involve the random assignment of individuals into beneficiaries 
(treatment group) and non-beneficiaries (control group); any difference with the control group is due 
                                                       
2 At the end of 2006, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social reported that the number of beneficiary families 
reached 11.1 million.   4 
to chance, not to selection. Thus, experimental designs are usually regarded as the most reliable 
evaluation  method  and  yielding  the  easiest-to-interpret  results  (Freeman  and  Rossi,  1993; 
Grossman,  1994;  Rawlings  and  Rubio,  2003).  When  randomization  is  not  feasible,  a  quasi-
experimental design can be constructed by generating a control group i.e., using statistical matching 
to select non-beneficiaries based on observable characteristics. 
Experimental and non-experimental designs have been used in impact evaluations of conditional 
cash transfers in some Latin American countries. To evaluate the Programa de Educación, Salud y 
Alimentación (PROGRESA) in Mexico, evaluators applied an experimental design with panel data 
that randomly assigned localities into treatment and control groups. A similar design was used to 
evaluate impacts of the Programa de Asignación Famíliar (PRAF) in Honduras, and of the Red de 
Protección Social in Nicaragua at the municipal and census area levels, respectively.
4 
In contrast to the abovementioned programs, the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil 
(PETI) in Brazil was evaluated using a quasi-experimental design with a single-cross section. This 
program was first implemented only in a few municipalities in the state of Pernambuco and later 
expanded to other states, including Bahia and Sergipe. Once the evaluation was planned after the 
program commenced, and it was not possible to randomly allocate the municipalities into treatment 
and control groups, then the treatment group was composed of three participating municipalities in 
separate states, and the comparison group of three similar municipalities was not included in the 
program.
5 
Other methodologies such as partial equilibrium and decomposition analysis were also used to 
evaluate similar impacts. Some studies that used these methodologies shed light on the issue about 
the impacts of transfer programs on income inequality and poverty in Brazil. A few of these studies 
are reviewed here in order to show how this research can contribute to address some knowledge 
gaps on this subject. 
By simulating the impacts that some income transfer programs would have – whether they were 
applied to their entire target population considering the rules for each program –  Rocha (2005) 
points out that the more recent programs would be more efficient in reducing poverty if the transfer 
values were much higher and the target population much larger. 
Hoffmann  (2006b)  evaluates  the  impacts  of  the  income  transfer  programs  on  poverty  and 
income inequality at national and regional levels. The study points out that 31 percent of the decline 
in Brazil’s inequality from 2002 to 2004 was due to the aforementioned programs. In the country’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
3  As  explained  in  the  first paragraph  of  the  Introduction,  the  reduction  in  income  inequality  generates  an 
additional effect that helps reduce poverty and reinforce the program’s desired impacts.  
4 Further details can be found in Rawlings and Rubio (2003). 
5 Idem.   5 
Northeast  region,  these  programs  accounted for  87  percent  of  the  estimated  decline  in  income 
distribution for the same period. 
Barros et al (2007c) estimated that Bolsa Família induced around 11.8 percent of the income 
inequality  fall  from  2001  to  2005,  while  BPC  would  have  caused  around  11.1  percent  of  this 
reduction.  However,  these  empirical  evidences  were  found  by  means  of  partial  equilibrium  or 
decomposition approaches. In this sense, they did not take into account some systemic (general 
equilibrium) effects induced by these programs as well as the feedback impacts from the economic 
system on household income. When poor families receive the income transfer, they increase their 
consumption expenditure, which tends to induce firms to produce more and, to some extent, employ 
more workers. When these people receive their payments, a new round of additional effects induced 
by their spending goes on. Then, the original amount of transfer induces the generation of a higher 
amount of income in the economy due to a multiplier effect. In other words, the poor families not 
only benefit from receiving transfers but also can benefit from the secondary effects induced by 
expending the original transfers. 
These  demand  effects  are  enhanced  when  we  take  into  account  the  differences  in  the 
expenditure  patterns  of  Brazilian  families  differentiated  by  income  level.  Among  the  poor  urban 
Brazilian households, the food expenditure was 40 percent of total consumption. On the other hand, 
the richest Brazilian households’ consumption standards are totally different; their food expenditure 
was just 12 percent, while health and education private services accounted for nearly 20 percent 
(Cury et al, 2006). 
Also, the relevance of the general equilibrium effects is justified by the size and evolution of the 
transfer programs between 2001 and 2005. In the same period, the total expenditure in the main 
targeted transfer program (Bolsa Família) increased 300 percent. According to the last Brazilian 
Central Government report (Perfil das Famílias Beneficiárias do Bolsa Família), in 2007 11 million 
families (around one in each five in the country) are program beneficiaries, reaching 45.8 million 
individuals (around one fourth of the population). 
On the other hand, we also expect that program effects are sensitive to the budget sources that 
are financing this specific public expenditure. As mentioned before, the increased amount in the 
transfers were financed in specific ways. Also, during 2003-2005 some important changes were 
introduced in the fiscal system. For example, in the social security budget, the sharpest revenue 
increase came from PIS-COFINS taxes (accounting for a 30% rise in their GDP ratio), which in 
2003-2004 were used to levy imports. Instances like this changed the size and composition of the   6 
fiscal  sources  that  were  financing  the  programs  and  reinforced  the  general  equilibrium  impacts 
derived from the programs’ recent evolution.
6  
Additionally, when the income of poor families increases, it is possible that this additional income 
can cause some people to reduce their labor offer and trim their working hours. If this happens, the 
abovementioned effects induced by expending the transfers would be less than expected.  
However, this negative effect of transfers on willingness to supply labor does not have empirical 
support until now. According to Medeiros et al (2007), the rate of participation in the labor market 
among program beneficiaries is 73 percent for the first poorest decile of distribution, 74 percent for 
the second and 76 percent for the third, while the same rate is 67 percent, 68 percent and 71 
percent, respectively, for people that live in households with no beneficiaries. These authors also 
evaluated  the  effects  of  Bolsa  Família  on  the  labor  supply  of  four  demographic groups: female 
heads of families, female non-heads of families, male heads of families and male non-heads of 
families. They found that only the beneficiary women heads of families have a lower likelihood of 
participating in the labor market than non-beneficiary women. 
CEDEPLAR (2006, apud Medeiros et al, 2007), also found positive effects of Bolsa Família on 
labor supply. According to this research: (i) Adults in households with beneficiaries presented a 
participation rate 3 percent higher than adults in households with no beneficiaries; (ii) The positive 
impact is higher among women at 4 percent than among men at 3 percent; and (iii) The program 
reduced by 6 percent the chances of women quitting their jobs. However, Tavares (2008) found 
evidence of an adverse effect of Bolsa Família on beneficiary mothers’ willingness to participate in 
the  labor market.  As  we  can  see,  there  is  some  evidence  that  Bolsa  Família  can reduce  labor 
market participation only among beneficiary mothers, yet this effect is not consensual even in this 
case. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that changes in transfer programs imply modification in 
both relative prices and quantities that can be far from being negligible. In this sense, it is not clear 
which would be the final prevailing effects.  
Proving that a specific methodology is unequivocally superior to others is not an easy task to do. 
Despite  this,  given  the  systemic  consequences  induced  by  the  changes  in  these  programs  on 
markets  and  on  financing  sources,  we  believe  that  using  a  CGE  model  integrated  to  a 
Microsimulation  model  (CGE-MS  model)  for  evaluating  the  impacts  of  Bolsa  Família  and  BPC 
                                                       
6  In  this  research  we  identified  in  the  Federal  Brazilian  Budget  (Orçamento  Geral  da  União)  the  specific 
expenditure  items  related  to  the  transfer  programs.  The  first  classification  level  for  expenditure  items  is 
identified by a system of 4 digit codes, named “programas”. For example, Bolsa Família has the code “1335” 
and can also be divided into a second classification level with 4 more digits, called “subprogramas”. On the 
other hand, each “programa”/“subprograma” is earmarked with its own revenue source. In this case, it is a 
system of 3 digit identification codes, called “fonte”. See Section 4 and Appendix D for more details about this 
subject.   7 
programs will generate information that will enhance the debate on the effects of these programs on 
poverty and inequality. This study believes that the model will capture some systemic effects that 
are not considered by the methodologies used in other studies. 
This final report is organized in five sections, including this introduction. Section 2 presents a 
brief literature review of the CGE-MS integration methodology. In the third section we describe the 
adopted  methodology,  including  all  the  steps  of  CGE-MS  integration  and  their  solution.  The 
research questions, the implemented simulations and results are presented in section 4. The last 
section presents the conclusion and the final remarks. Appendices A, B, C and D supplement this 
report with the equations used in the CGE model, intermediate results, and data on the transfer 
programs. 
2. Review of literature on CGE and Microsimulation integration. 
The first assessments on the issue of the distributional and poverty effects of economic policies 
using CGE models was formally presented by Adelman and Robinson (1978) in a book applied to 
South  Korea.  This  book  was  remarkable  for  combining  one  of  the  first  CGE  models  with  the 
treatment  of  income  distribution  through  a  highly  disaggregated  model.  Dervis  et  al  (1982)  and 
Gunning  (1983)  followed  the  same  path,  introducing  new  modeling  techniques  to  this  issue.  A 
number of different approaches were developed after these initial studies, and this section briefly 
presents some characteristics of these methodologies and highlights their main advantages and 
drawbacks.
7 
The first approach is characterized by a CGE model with representative households (CGE-RH). 
This  method  utilizes  distributional  analysis  by  comparing  the  changes  in  income  of  these 
representative households (RHs) as generated by the CGE model between the different groups of 
RHs and applying these changes to households’ income using survey data to compare between 
distributive indicators before and after policy implementation. Poverty analysis is made by applying 
the changes in income of the RH(s) generated by the CGE model on household survey data to 
compare ex ante and ex post poverty indicators.
8  
However,  this  approach  is  disadvantageous  because  it  either  assumes  no  changes  in  intra-
group income distribution, or that the changes in intra-group distribution follow an exogenously fixed 
                                                       
7 We are considering the same categories proposed by Savard (2003), where more details can be found. 
8 Dervis et al (1982), de Janvry et al (1991), Chia et al (1994), Decaluwé et al (1999a), Colatei and Round 
(2001) and Agenor et al (2001) present evaluations based on this approach. Following this methodology, 
Coady and Harris (2004) evaluated the income (or welfare) effects of the conditional cash transfer program 
Progresa in Mexico, which has been used as reference for similar programs implemented in other developing 
countries. In this study, they point to the importance of evaluating this kind of policy with this methodology in 
order to distinguish the direct from the indirect income (welfare) effects. Before, partial equilibrium approaches 
could only capture the former effects generated by the transfers, but not the latter effects due to the impact of 
cash transfers and their financing on the level and composition of demand and supply.   8 
statistical law between the mean (µ) and the variance (σ
2) of the income distribution. This drawback 
is more serious when the analysis is performed with a CGE model using just one RH. In this case 
the impacts on poverty are evaluated by applying the change of income of the RH on all households 
in the survey data. As a consequence, this approach does not capture both inter- and intra-group 
effects because it just changes the mean (µ) but not the variance (σ
2) of the distribution. 
Despite  these  disadvantages,  this  approach  can  easily  be  implemented  by  simulating  the 
economic policy with a CGE model and using the simulation outputs to make distributional and 
poverty analysis.  
The  second  approach  is  called  integrated  multi-households  CGE  (CGE-IMH)  modeling  and 
consists of incorporating as many households as are present in income and expenditure household 
surveys (or a large sample of them) to the CGE model.
9  
Compared to the CGE-RH, this method has the advantage of allowing changes in intra-group 
income distribution and not requiring pre-definition of household groups, which gives more flexibility 
to poverty and income distribution analysis since the household groupings can be defined in more 
and different ways. 
Nonetheless,  the  large  size  of  the  model  can  complicate  its  numerical  solution  and  the 
conciliation of data from household income or expenditure surveys and national accounts, due to 
under- or over-reported variables in the household surveys. 
According to Bonnet and Mahieu (2000, apud Savard, 2003), the above limitations could be 
overcome by using microsimulation which is required to analyze income distribution (dispersion) 
effects. 
Thus,  in  order  to  better  assess  distributional  and/or  poverty  effects  of  economic  policies, 
Bourguignon et al (2003) presented a CGE model integrated to a microsimulation (MS) model by a 
top-down  method  that  permits  the  decomposing  of  CGE  results  to  their  micro  or  individual 
components. The CGE model is solved first and the changes in the vector of prices, wages, and 
aggregate employment variables are transmitted to the MS model, which calculates the variations in 
individual wages, self-employment incomes, and employment status that would be consistent with 
the  set  of  macro  variables  generated  by  the  CGE  model.  In  this  sense,  the  top-down  model 
assesses the distributive and poverty impacts from the shock or the policy change simulated in the 
CGE model. 
                                                       
9 Decaluwé et al (1999b), Cockburn (2001), and Boccanfuso et al (2003) applied this approach to perform 
poverty and income distribution analysis.   9 
Despite providing richness in household behavior and presenting extreme flexibility in modeling 
specific  behaviors  as  household  decisions  and  labor  market  switching  rules,  the  reactions  of 
households are not fed back and thus not taken into account by the CGE model. 
Thus, in order to better assess the distributional and/or poverty effects of economic policies 
Savard (2003) and Muller (2004) proposed the methodology of using a CGE model linked to an MS 
model with a bi-directional linkage between them that would guarantee a convergence of solutions 
for both models. 
3. Methodology 
This section describes the methodology used in this research. The following three subsections 
describe the CGE model, the microsimulation model, and the integration between the CGE and the 
MS models. 
3.1. The CGE Model 
This section briefly describes some characteristics of the CGE mode, (as they are standard 
features) and emphasizes the presentation on the labor market, the household income formation 
process and government expenditure. Further details on this model can be found in Appendix A.2.
10 
The CGE model is used for a single country and recognizes 42 domestic sectors,
11 8 families,
12 
the  Government,  and  the  external  sector.  The  model  takes  the  hypothesis  that  the  Brazilian 
economy is an international price taker but that the movement of its export prices can affect the 
external demand for Brazilian goods through an export demand equation. Foreign product supply 
does not face any constraint to attend to Brazilian demands. The supply of the 42 domestic sectors 
is represented by a function that converts 7 types of labor,
13 capital and intermediate inputs into 
products that are sold as imperfect substitutes in the domestic and international markets.
14 
Concerning demand for products, the utility-maximizing families choose their consumption levels 
according to a Cobb-Douglas function. Families and firms demand domestic and imported goods 
according to the Armington (1969) hypothesis. Firms demand commodities to fulfill their production 
                                                       
10 The CGE model used in this research is an extension of the one presented by Cury et al (2005) where 
further details can be found. This is a result of a series of developments made in the model proposed by 
Devarajan et al (1991), as can be seen in Cury (1998), Barros et al (2000) and Coelho et al (2003). 
11 These 42 sectors are listed in Appendix B. 
12 Poor urban families headed by active individual (F1), poor urban families headed by non-active individual 
(F2), poor rural families (F3), urban families with low average income (F4), urban families with medium income 
(F5), rural families with medium income (F6), families with high average income (F7), and families with high 
income (F8), which have a significant income proportion from no-wage source. 
13 Unskilled informal (L1), skilled informal (L2), formal with low skill (L3), formal with average skill (L4), formal 
with high skill (L5), public servant with low skill (L6) and public servant with high skill (L7). 
14 The SAM used in this research is fully described and documented by Cury et al (2006), which can be 
requested by e-mail with the authors.   10 
requirements  of  intermediate  inputs  according  to  the  technical  coefficients from  the  input-output 
matrix. The Government expenditure faces the fixed budget amount registered for the base year 
according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
3.1.1. The Labor Market 
Firms demand the seven types of labor, classified according to contract status and schooling.
15 
It is assumed that firms aim at maximizing profits under technological conditions imposed by the 
production function, in an environment where prices of inputs, production factors (labor and capital) 
and output are beyond their control. Therefore, as a result of this maximization, for each type of 
worker a specific demand curve is defined by the condition that their marginal productivities equal 
their wages:
16 
il il il i W F X P = ¶ ¶ *   (3.1.1) 
This  research  uses  a  CGE  model  integrated  to  an  MS  model.  In  the  latter,  each  individual 
chooses between offering or not offering his labor in the market after comparing the observed wage 
in his sector to his reservation wage. Thus, the labor supply by type of worker is generated by the 
MS model and communicated to the CGE model, where it is exogenous.
17 
The labor market equilibrium in the integrated CGE-MS model (employment and wage), for each 
type of worker l, is determined by E
/, the intersection point between the labor demand (L
d) and the 
occupational level ( )
*
MS Lsl , which is calculated by the MS model and transmitted to the CGE model. 
The difference between the economically active population (L
0) and the employment level (L), (L
0 – 






                                                       
15 The labor treatment that follows is applied for the five types of private workers. The two types of public 
servants follow the traditional labor market closure of CGE models with either wage or employment being 
fixed. Therefore, there  is no substitution between public servants and the private kinds of workers in the 
sectors where there are no public companies. In the sectors  where  public and private firms co-exist, the 
changes in the public-private composition of labor are related to the changes in the public-private composition 
of the sectoral representative firm. 
16 The derivative of the profit function with relation to the factor demand must be equal to the factor’s price 
(first order condition). 
17 Further details on the determination of labor supply by type of worker are presented in Section 3.2. 
18 In previous versions of this CGE model an alternative specification of the labor market was adopted, in 
which involuntary unemployment was captured by a wage curve as proposed by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1990, 1994).   11 






E  ’ 
L  s  l *M  S 
   L
0     L 
   U  
   E  
0 
 
It  deserves  to  be  mentioned  that  the  CGE  model  assumes  that  this  market  equilibrium 
mechanism does not describe the adjustments for the two types of public servants considered in the 
model. In Brazil, public servants are hired by means of official examination for a governmental post 
and  their  working  contract  includes  a  job  stability  clause.  Therefore,  it  is  assumed  that  their 
employment levels are fixed and that the disequilibria in their labor markets are adjusted by changes 
in wages. 
The labor market closure is not formulated by sector, but rather by type of labor. In this sense, 
the adjustment mechanism is from the aggregate to the sectoral level. After an economic shock, first 
we have the definition of the aggregate levels of labor supply, wages and unemployment for each 
type of labor by the interaction of their aggregate demand and supply curves, as explained earlier. 
To  define  the  employment  and  wage  levels  in  each  sector,  it  is  assumed  that  the  sectoral 
differentiation  of  wages  is  exogenous,  remaining  the  same  as  in  the  model’s  base  year,  which 
implies in-sector imperfect segmentation in the labor market. 
The  hypothesis  implicit  in  the  adopted  mechanism  is  that  workers  with  similar  observed 
productive  characteristics  (schooling  and  contract  status)  are  paid  differently  according  to  their 
sector of employment. The idea is to capture the fact that, despite the abovementioned similarities, 
the  workers  have  other  characteristics  such  as  profession  type  and  sector-specific  training  or 
qualifications which do not permit their migration from sector(s) paying lower wages to sector(s) 
paying higher wages to induce the equalization of sectoral wages for each kind of worker. Pinheiro 
and Ramos (1995) showed that the wage differentials among sectors in Brazil have been stable for 
a long time.  
The wage of each kind of worker in each sector (Wli) is obtained by the interaction between the 
average  wage  for  each  type  of  labor  (Wl)  and  an  exogenous  variable  for  the  relative  wage   12 
differentials among the sectors. With this information, and using a sector- and labor type-specific 
demand curve (equation 3.1.1), we can also determine the sectoral employment level of each type 
of labor (Fil), which is aggregated by a Cobb-Douglas function to define the sector i’s composite 
labor.
 19  
3.1.2. The Income Transfer Mechanisms 
This section presents the formation process of income flows received by families and firms. The 
remuneration  of  capital  is  paid  to  firms  and  the  labor  earnings  to  workers.  In  each  sector,  the 
payments to capital are distributed to the firms according to their initial share in the total earnings of 
capital.  
The eight types (h) of families receive earnings from the seven types (l) of labor according to the 
shares (ehl) of these workers in these families, which also receive the income transferred by firms 
(YK) according to the family h’s share in these income flows (ehk).
20 Finally, the families also receive 
net  remittances  from  abroad  (REh),  adjusted  by  the  exchange  rate  (R),  and  transfers  from  the 
Government (TG), in the form of payment of benefits (direct income transfers) and other transfers 
(essentially domestic debt interest) that are allocated to the families according to the initial shares 
(qht).
 21 Therefore, the family h’s income is: 
h hk hk l hl h RE R TG pindex YK W Y * * * ) ( * * + + + = q e e   (3.1.2) 
3.1.3. The Government  
The Government spends by consuming (∑i i CG ) and transferring resources to the economic 
agents.  It  plays  a  very  important  role  in  the  process  of  determining  secondary  income,  once  it 
directs  a  share  of  its  transfers  to  firms  as  interests  on  the  domestic  debt  and  also  demands 
products. Similar to families, the sharing of government transfers to the types of firms follows the 
proportions observed in the base year (qk). Finally, it also transfers resources abroad (GE) and its 
total expenditure is: 
( ) GE R TG pindex GG k ht
i
i CG * * * + + + =∑ q q   (3.1.3) 
To face all expenditures, the Government relies on three types of collections: (1) direct taxes 
levied on firms’ and families’ income (fh and fk, respectively), and (2) indirect taxes on domestic and 
                                                       
19 Equation 2.1 in Appendix A. 
20 The firms are classified into small (self-employed people) and large (other firms). The large firms transfer 
interest, dividends and others, and house rental, to families.   13 
imported goods (proportional to production (X), domestic sales (D), imports (M) and value added 
(VA) amounts). Besides these sources, it also receives transfers from abroad (gfbor) and finally, the 
balance of the social security system (SOCBAL).
22 Thus, the Government’s total revenue is: 
SOCBAL gfbor R M
i i i i RG
i
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where hi are the tax rates on production, xi and pi are, respectively, the sector i’s PIS-COFINS 
rates on domestic sales value (cumulative regime) and on value-added (non-cumulative regime),  i s  
and  ki  are,  respectively,  the  ICMS-IPI  tax  rates  on  value-added  and  imports,  mi  is  the  tariff  on 
imports, while gi are the PIS-COFINS rates on imports of commodity type i. 
An eventual lack of government resources is defined as a government deficit that, together with 
domestic private (firms and families) and foreign savings, defines the amount of resources spent as 
investments. 
The indirect tax revenue (INDTAX) from domestically produced goods is given by: 






i i i VA D PD X PX INDTAX * ) ( * * * * s p x h   (3.1.5) 
where PXi * Xi is the production value, PDi * Di is the gross revenue value from domestic sales 
and VAi, hj, xi, si and pi were presented in equation (3.1.4). 
The other equation that contributes to Government revenue and deserves to be mentioned is the 
one describing the indirect taxes on imports revenue, which is given by: 
( )( ) i i i i i i M R pwm TARIFF * . * g k m + + =∑                (3.1.6) 
where pwmi is the external price of imports (in US$), mi is the tariff on imports, ki is ICMS-IPI 
rates on imports and gi are the PIS-COFINS rates on imports. 
3.1.4. CGE Model Closures 
The identities that define the model closures are described in the equation list in section 2 of 
Appendix A. For the price system, the nominal exchange rate (variable R) is exogenous. On the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
21  These  transfers  include  the  social  security  benefits  as  well  as  other  programs  such  as  unemployment 
benefits, income transfer social programs, and other cash benefits. 
22 In fact, social security is treated as an agent apart from the Government in the model, not only because of 
the considerable amount of resources that it handles in Brazil, but also because of the contributions that it 
applies on either the company’s income (here again in a different form) or on the installments of the added 
value of labor.   14 
other  hand,  the  price  index  (PINDEX)  is  endogenous.  In  the  external  closures,  foreign  savings 
(FSAV) is also exogenous, which implies a fixed balance of trade. 
On the side of the public sector, the government consumption (GDTOT) is fixed exogenously but 
the total public deficit (GOVSAV) is variable. Also, on the Savings side, the marginal propensity to 
save (MPS) is exogenous. In the Savings – Investment relationship, the model can be classified as 
“savings  driven”  where  the  total  Investment  (INVEST)  is  determined  by  the  total  Savings.  The 
capital stock is fixed which means that the produced investment goods are not affecting their current 
capacity on the economy. Finally, the factor labor closure is fully described in sub-section 3.1.1. 
3.2. The Microsimulation Model 
This  section  describes  the  specification  of  the  household  income  model  used  for  the 
microsimulation.  The  initial  hypothesis  for  using  a  microsimulation  model  is  the  fact  that  public 
income  transfers  can  induce  changes  in  individuals’  behavior,  especially  concerning  their 
willingness  to  participate  in  the  job  market  and  their  level  of  expenditure.  The  application  of  a 
microsimulation model will allow for evaluating the effects of the programs Bolsa Família and BPC 
on  the  individual’s  willingness  to  supply  labor,  and  also  on  poverty  and  income  distribution 
indicators, considering a nationally representative sample of the population.
23 
The microsimulation model adopted in this research is based on the procedure proposed by 
Savard (2003). The main adaptation for this model is the use of another segmented labor market.
24 
As described before, we will assume five segments with flexible wage that adjusts with labor supply 
and demand. For the unemployed, the reservation wage of each individual determines its potential 
choice between offering (or not) his labor in the market. Furthermore, a worker decides to quit the 
job market if the observed wage is lower than his reservation wage. 
The procedure used to estimate the microsimulation model is applied to individuals in active age 
(over 10 years old) belonging to the five types of factors (L1 to L5) that have the wages paid in the 
private sector as the main source of income. In Brazil, once the public servants’ (factors L6 and L7) 
working  contract  includes  a  job  stability  clause,  it  is  assumed  that  their  employment  levels  are 
fixed.
25 
                                                       
23 Since the database used in this work, the National Research of Sample by Domicile (PNAD), does not have 
information about the domicile’s expenditures, the microsimulation model will be reduced to the analysis of the 
individual’s labor offer. See Appendix B for further details. 
24 In Savard (2003), the labor market is segmented in two types: one with a fixed wage and another one with a 
flexible wage. Therefore, an individual could alter across three states (observing the implicit costs of choosing 
each one of them): offering her workforce in each one of the two markets or getting unemployed by choice. 
25 The Brazilian labor market also has a segment of non-flexible wages. However, this segment is formed 
primarily by public sector workers with job stability clauses. These workers who belong to the factors L6 and 
L7 are not included in the MS model, but they are agents in the CGE model.   15 
A prior concern regarding the individuals’ reservation wage estimation is the issue related to 
labor supply identification. In principle, the expansion of income transfers exogenously affects the 
willingness to supply labor of various demographic groups in different ways. Thus, it is necessary to 
estimate an equation for individual labor supply, identified by the number of individuals’ work hours, 
as a function of the individual wage-hour after changes in income transfers for each demographic 
group has been considered. Besides, it is also necessary to correct the potential auto-selection bias 
to  labor  supply  participation.  After  applying this  procedure,  it  is  possible  to  properly  identify  the 
different reactions of the labor supply to exogenous changes in the size of transfers for individuals in 
each demographic group. Therefore, the estimation procedure can be described in two steps as 
follows: 
Step 1 
At this microsimulation stage, we are interested in the individual impact due an income transfers 
shock, especially for the demographic group of single mothers who are heads of household. This 
demographic group  is the  main  beneficiary  of  the  Bolsa  Família  and  deserves  special  attention 
because it is the most sensitive for non-labor income from transfer programs, as found in our MS 
results.  
Our empirical strategy is based on a simpler version in which the worker makes an individual 
decision.  Due  to  the  identification  problem  of  the  non-linear  budget  constraint,  we  estimated  a 
reduced-form  hour  equation  that  depends  on  the  individual  wage,  the  income  from  transfers 
programs,  other  income,  and  a  number  of  demographic  controls.  The  “other  income”  variable 
combines all sources of non-labor income, following Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). This last variable 
for  the  married  women, for  example,  is  calculated  by  taking  the  husband’s  actual  earnings  into 
account. On the other hand, we created another variable that represents the BPC and Bolsa Família 
programs in order to capture the effects of the income transfers on labor supply.
26 
The  predicted  working  hours  are  obtained  from  the  observed  and  non-observed  individuals’ 
characteristics, as well as the family H’s characteristics (to which this individual belongs) and his 
own  wage. Therefore, the  worker i’s predicted hours of work (
j
i h ) is estimated by the semi-log 
specification according to Blundell and McCurdy (1999):
 27 
( ) 3 , 2 , 1 ,..., 1 , log log log = = + + + + + = j    e    n i u Z B Q w h i i i i i i i i i
j
i g d b q a   (3.2.1) 
                                                       
26 We do not use a household labor supply model that is based on a family joint decision due to various 
difficulties in identifying the domestic production function (Becker, 1965) from the PNAD data. In this case, we 
followed  the  recommendation  of  Gronau  (1986)  where  the  lack  of  domestic  production  data  should  be 
replaced by family characteristics (such as all types of income) and demographic aspects. 
27 This functional form was proposed because it is consistent with 1) the existence of individuals’ preferences 
by labor and leisure, and 2) the presence of households’ budget constraints (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).   16 
where  i a ,  i q , i b ,  i d  and  i g are the parameters to be estimated;  i w  is the hourly wage rate for 
individual i;  i Q  is the vector of the total household income net of the earnings (including income 
transfers) received by the individual i;  i B  is the vector of benefits received (Bolsa Família and BPC) 
by individual i in 2003;  i Z  represents the individuals’ observable characteristics;  i u  is the random 
error term, which captures the non-observable characteristics that affect the individual labor supply; 
and j is the individual’s demographic group, 1 being  for men, 2 for woman head of household with 
children, and 3 for other women (who are not heads of families). The value of q  determines the 
substitution effect related to sensitivity of individual labor supply to changes in wages. The values of 
b  and d  represent the income effect, that is, the impact of non-labor income on labor supply. 
The  i Z  vector of individual characteristics was composed of the following variables: 
a i D famsize ge ge educ Z    , , a , a ,
2 =  
where educ denotes the number of years of schooling, age is a proxy to the level of experience; 
famsize  is  the  family  size  in  terms  of  number  of  individuals  (excluding  pensioners,  domestic 
servants and their parents),  a D  is a dummy for the area where the family’s domicile is located (0 for 
urban and 1 for rural). 
The  individual  working hour  is  observed  just for  those that  are  already  employed..Thus, the 
sample  of  individuals  that  present  a  strictly  positive  hour  of  work  is  not  random.  However,  it  is 
possible that the choice to work is related to the income-dependent variables, either from labor or 
non-labor (other income sources). Therefore, the situation is typically one of endogenous selection, 
in which there is a decision to participate or not in the labor market and, given that the individual had 
decided to work, it is necessary to determine how many working hours he will offer. In order to 
control for potential selection bias, the procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) is applied, which 
consists of: 
( ) ( ) { } i i i i Z Y S g F = = z | 1 Pr                                   (3.2.2) 
where:  F  is  a  function  of  accumulated  distribution,  where  i S   is  a  qualitative  variable 
representing the occupational choice for an individual i: this variable will take the value 0 if the 
individual  does  not  supply  work  or  1  if  otherwise.  The  variable  i g   is  a  vector  of  estimated 
parameters that determine the probability of the individual to take part in the labor market.  i Y  is the 
vector representing the variables related to the labor and non-labor incomes that affect the decision 
of supplying labor by individual i. As before,  i Z  are the individual characteristics that determine the 
probability of participating in the labor market.   17 
The equations (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) are estimated by the two-stage method proposed by Heckman 
(1979). In this model, equation (3.2.2) is also known as the equation for correcting sample selection 
bias by non-observables. These equations are run separately for three demographic groups: men, 
women with children and head of family, and other women, which permit estimating the elasticity of 
labor  supply.  The  inverse  of  Mills’  ratio  ( ) g l z   is  extracted from  equation  (3.2.2),  which  will  be 
applied  to  equation  (3.2.1)  in  a  way  that  the  parameters  of  these  equations  are  going  to  be 
consistently estimated.  
After estimating the coefficients in (3.2.1) and the inverse of Mills’ ratio, it will then be possible to 
estimate  the  adjusted  working  hour  of  each  individual, 
j
i h ,  based  on  the  observed  and  non-
observed characteristics. The adjusted working hour is then applied to the individual i’s observed 
wage,  i w ˆ , which results in the adjusted individual i’s wage ( i w ).  
Step 2 
In accordance with the formulated hours of work model, the individual labor supply is a function 
of individual market wage rates and non-labor income, among other variables. These wage rates 
can be observed for paid employed individuals. For non-paid persons there is an unobservable 
wage rate which an individual could potentially receive. According to Heckman (1974) it is possible 
to express this reservation wage as a function of their individual characteristics as well as non-labor 
income and other constraints. 
Following Savard (2003), the non-observed reservation wage is obtained from the observable 
and non-observable individual’s characteristics, as well as the family H’s characteristics to which 
this individual belongs. Due to the importance of evaluating the reservation wage before and after 
an income transfer shock, we include non-labor income in the structural reservation wage equation 
and identify the income transfer variable separately. Therefore, the worker i’s reservation log wage, 
i w , is estimated by the equation: 
( )    n i u Z B Q w i i i i i i i ,..., 1 , log log log = + + + + = g d b a            (3.2.3) 
where  i a ,  i b ,  i d  and  i g  are the parameters to be estimated. The observed wage,  i w ˆ , is the 
hourly wage adjusted by the procedure described in step 1;  i Q ,  i B  and  i Z are the same variables 
presented earlier. 
Due  to  the  impossibility  of  observing  the  wage  offer  to  the  sample’s  individuals  who  are 
unemployed, we need to estimate a probit model that determines the probability of the individual to 
take part in the labor market. This probability, 1 = i S , is estimated by the function: 
( ) ( ) { } g i i i i D Z Y S g F = = z | 1 Pr                             (3.2.4)   18 
where: F is a function of accumulated distribution;  i g  is a vector of estimated parameters that 
determine the probability of the individual to take part in the labor market; as before,  i Z  and  i Y  are, 
respectively, the individual characteristics and the work and non-work income that determine the 
probability of participating in the labor market; and  g D  is a demographic dummy (0 for man, 1 for 
woman that is mother and head of family, 2 for other women). 
Finally, the equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) are estimated by the two-stage method proposed by 
Heckman (1979). In this model, equation (3.2.4) is also known as the equation for correcting the 
sample selection bias by non-observable. From this equation, the inverse of Mills’ ratio  ( ) g l z  is 
extracted, which will then be applied in (3.2.3) in a way that the parameters of these equations are 
going to be consistently estimated. 
After the estimation of coefficients in (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) and the inverse of Mills’ ratio, it will be 
possible to calculate the reservation wage of each individual, 
k
i w  (k = 0,1) based on his observed 
and non-observed characteristics. If the individual belongs to state  1 = k , the reservation wage of 
worker i will be used in comparison with the observed wage,  i w , to select the potential employed or 
unemployed persons. If he pertains to the state  0 = k , the reservation wage of this individual is 
obtained to construct a rank of potential newly employed persons.  
For  each  employed  person,  this  procedure  applies  the  following  criterion:  if  the  estimated 
reservation wage  ) (
j
i w  is higher than the earned wage ( j w ) observed in the database, then this 




employed y  potentiall   is   he    ,      otherwise
unemployed y  potentiall   is       individual    ,      if i w w
k
i i  
After making this comparison for each employed person, the model determines the Heckman 
pre-simulation occupational level by private labor type ( ) HLsl  by summing up the number of people 
originally  unemployed  with  the  number  of  people  that  would  be  unemployed  according  to  the 
Heckman criterion. 
It deserves mentioning that this occupational level by private labor type ( ) HLsl  is different from 
the original level in the database ( ) Lsl , once there are people in the database that work and earn 
wages  lower  than  their estimated  reservation  wages.  Actually,  this  happens  because  these  last 
wages are estimates of the ones that these people could earn in the market according to their own 
and  their  families’  characteristics.  Therefore,  merely  applying  the  Heckman  procedure  to  the 
database changes the occupational level for each labor type.   19 
As proposed by Savard (2003), the selection of individuals who should be unemployed starts 
with classifying workers according to their reservation wages. Those with the highest reservation 
wage will be the first to become unemployed if the real wage decreases. If there is positive change 
in the real wages, the first to be employed will be those with lower reservation wage. 
3.3. Integration Between The CGE and The MS model 
The impacts of the Bolsa Família and BPC programs on welfare indicators are assessed with an 
integrated CGE-MS modeling framework with a bi-directional linkage between them to guarantee 
convergence of solutions for both models. The communication between these models occurs by 
means of wages and occupational level of labor. This sub-section describes the way these models 
are integrated to generate a convergent solution for them. 
Running the integrated model involves the following procedure: we first compute the income 
transfer changes in the MS model and sequentially run the CGE model. By computing the changes 
of  income transfer  programs,  the  MS  model  simulates the  variations  in  labor  supply  by  type  of 
worker that are communicated to the CGE model. 
The  basic  issue  is  implementing  the  variations  of  labor  supply  by  type  of  private  worker, 
calculated by the MS model, and of Government expenses that are due to changes in transfer 
programs in the CGE model, in order to calculate the induced alterations of the average real wage 
for each type of private worker and the general price index.
28 These last changes are fed back into 
the MS model, where they serve as exogenous variables, to define a new labor occupational level 
for  each  kind  of  private  worker.  Again,  these  are  factored  into  the  CGE  model  as  exogenous 
variables, producing new values for the average real wage for each type of private worker, which, 
together with the general price index, are then retransmitted to the MS model in order to define labor 
occupational levels compatible  with the new  value of the average real wage specific by private 
worker type.  
This iterative process continues until the difference between the values of occupational levels for 
the private labor types in the CGE model between two consecutive iterative steps are very close to 
zero.  The  following  illustrates  the  bi-directional  procedure  in  the  case  of  simulating  the 
implementation of changes in the Bolsa Família and BPC programs according to each simulation, 
which will then be described in the next section: 
Step 1 
                                                       
28 The model’s numeraire is the nominal exchange rate.   20 
The MS model contains data about thousands of individuals, estimates the reservation wage 
(
j
i w ) for each person i in the database, and defines occupational levels for each category of private 
labor by means of the equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4), as mentioned in the previous section. 
The  first  step  in  the  integrated  solution  consists  of  replacing  the  values  that  represent  the 
benefits  received  from  the  income  transfer  programs  in  2003  ( i B )  in  the  equations  (3.2.3)  and 
(3.2.4) by the specific new values of these benefits (
*
i B ) in each simulation, and then re-estimating 
to calculate the Heckman post-simulation occupational level for each private labor type (
*
MS HLsl ), 
which is the occupational level under the simulated conditions. 
In order to capture the changes in the occupational level by private labor type due only to the 
variation  in  the  benefits,  isolated  from  the  effects  of  applying  the  Heckman  procedure  to  the 
database, the difference between the Heckman post-simulation occupational level by private labor 
type (
*
MS HLsl ) and the Heckman pre-simulation level (HLsl ) is calculated and added to the original 
occupational level in the database (Lsl ) to have an occupational level that is compatible with the 
new values of benefits, that is, a post-simulation occupational level by private labor type calculated 
by the MS model (
*
MS Lsl ). 
Step 2 
The occupational level after implementing the changes in income transfer programs (
*
MS Lsl ) as 
well as the new amount of given benefits (
* B ) are then applied to the CGE model, where 
BPC BF t n i B B
i t
t
i ,     ; ,..., 1     ,
* = = =∑∑                          (3.2.5) 
and 
t
i B  is the amount of benefits that individual i received from Bolsa Família and BPC.  
The new values of taxes that are used to finance the changes in transfer programs (
* B ) are also 
applied to the CGE model in order to simulate the changes in the economic environment induced by 
the variation in income transfer programs. All these changes will induce the economic system to 
achieve  a  new  general  equilibrium  and,  as  part  of  this  process,  the  labor  market  will  reach 
equilibrium with new real wage values (
*
CGE W ) for each kind of worker. 
Step 3 
The  percentage  change  in  the  average  real  wage  (
*
CGE W D )  for  each  kind  of  private  worker 
obtained from the simulation using the CGE model is applied on the wages earned by each person i 
in the MS model’s database ( i w ), which belongs to the respective category of worker, defining after-  21 
shock  values  for  earned  wages  (
*
i w )  by  each  kind  of  private  worker.  For  example,  if  the  post-
simulation average real wage of worker type l5 (formal with high skill) in the CGE model is 5 percent 
higher than its initial value, then all wages earned by each one in this category in the MS model’s 
database are raised by 5 percent.  
After  this,  we  compare  the  values  of  these  new  individual  wages 
*
i w   with  their  respective 
reservation wage amounts (
j
i w ) by means of the Heckman procedure. Using the same previously 
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Therefore,  after  classifying  the  workers  by  their  reservation  wages,  those  with  the  highest 
reservation wage will be the first to become unemployed if the real wage decreases, and in the case 
of a positive change in real wages, the first to be employed will be those with lower reservation 
wage.  By  adding  to  the  initial  occupational  level  the  number  of  people  to  be  employed  or 
unemployed according to this criterion, one obtains a new level of occupation for each private labor 
type ( )
*
MS Lsl . 
Step 4 
These new occupational levels are then transmitted to the CGE model as shown in the figure 
below that illustrates the iterative procedure: 
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If the occupational levels calculated by the MS model are different from those in the CGE model, 
they change the equilibrium of the labor markets, which will present new values for wages and 
induce  changes  in  the  economic  environment  as  a  whole  until  the  CGE  model  reaches  a  new 
equilibrium  situation.  In  this  sense,  step  2  restarts,  but  without  changes  in  benefits  and  their 
financing  sources,  and this  integrated  solution procedure  loops  until  the  difference  between  the 
post-simulation occupational level calculated by the MS model ( * Lsl ) in one round is reasonably 
close to the one obtained in the previous round.
29  
This  association  is  consistently  done  with  the  equilibrium  of  aggregate  markets  in  the  CGE 
model, which requires that: (i) relative changes in average earnings in the MS model must be equal 
to changes in wage rates obtained in the CGE model for each private wage group in the labor 
market; (ii) relative changes in the number of privately waged workers by labor market segment in 
the  MS  model  must  match  those  same  changes  in  the  CGE  model;  and  (iii)  changes  in  the 
consumption price vector, p, must be consistent with the CGE equivalent price indicator.
30 
According to the above procedure, the private labor supply is being modified along simulation 
iterations; for example, some individuals will be losing their former jobs. If this happens, the share of 
each  household  in  the  total  income  of  each  labor  category  can  also  change  (parameter  ehl  in 
equation  3.1.2).  In  order  to  capture  these  variations,  we  incorporate  the  differences  among  the 
parameter  ehl,  along  the  simulation  rounds  as  a  shock  in  the  CGE  as  well,  which  performs 
simultaneously with the procedures described in this section.
31  
3.4. Non-Labor Income Procedures 
After  the  models’  solutions  convergence  it  is  still  necessary  to  treat  the  non-labor  incomes 
before calculating poverty and inequality indicators. Basically, the variables related to these sources 
of income in the MS model follow the CGE variations or hold the same value as the household 
survey, as shown in table 3.1. In the former case, the changes from the CGE model are transmitted 





                                                       
29 In general, the convergent solutions were obtained in the seventh iteration between the models. 
30  The  change  in  consumption  prices  is  transmitted  from  the  CGE  model  to  the  MS  model  through  the 
variations in the real wages by private worker type, which is used as linking aggregate variables between the 
models. 
31 Specifically for the simulations carried out, the share parameter ehl did not present significant differences 
among the simulation rounds. They are so small that they become visible just in the 4
th decimal case. This fact 
implies that, practically, there was no variation of the shares along the simulation.    23 
Table 3.1: Integration of CGE-MS model for non labor income (Base 2003) 
Household Income Source  Procedure in the Microsimulation (PNAD 2003) 
Self Employed Income 
CGE results variations of these income sources are applied  
to the microsimulation model vectors.
32
 
Interest, Dividends and Others 
and House Rental 
CGE results variation of these income flows individualized to the 8 family types in the 
model are applied to the microsimulation model vectors.
33
 
Retiree and Pension Public 
Benefits  The same vector value of the microsimulation base year model. 
Retiree and Pension Private 
Benefits  The same vector value of the microsimulation base year model. 
Donation received  The same vector value of the microsimulation base year model. 
For each family, the above sources are deflated by a family specific price index (after simulation). 
34 
 
4. Simulations and Results 
This  section  presents  features  of  the  simulation  in  order  to  better  understand  the  reported 
results, which are also presented below. 
4.1. Description of simulations  
This subsection describes the simulations carried out in this project which are related to the 
project research questions: what are the impacts of the current income transfer programs on income 
distribution and poverty in Brazil? Is each program accomplishing its objective of poverty reduction? 
What would be the impacts of these programs if they have alternative policy designs? 
Our simulation objective is to assess the effects of changing the values and the beneficiaries of 
the programs Bolsa Família and BPC from the ones presented in 2003 to the ones presented in 
2005. We thus proceeded with the simulation as a response to the following question: How would 
the Brazilian economy in 2003 (base year) behave if it had the same characteristics of the transfer 
program in the year 2005? To do so, we proceed in the following way. 
Transfer  Programs.  We  addressed  the  changes  between  2003  and  2005  with  similar 
procedures  adopted  by  Barros  et  al  (2007c).
35  However,  we  construct  a  specific  imputation 
methodology  for  the  2005  additional  benefits  (this  is  fully  explained  in  Appendix  C).  Given  this 
information, we then took the benefits share among the eight CGE model families with amounts for 
each program given by the administrative Federal Budget data, observing the consistency with our 
SAM data. The values are shown in table 4.1. 
                                                       
32 Vector included in the matrix (ehk * YK) in equation (3.1.2). 
33 Another vector of matrix (ehk * YK ) plus Government transfers at equation 3.1.2. 
34 Weighted  average  of  the  commodities  price  changes,  whose  weights  are  the  shares  of  the  respective 
commodity expenses in the total consumption expenditure of that family. 
35 For 2003, at micro data level, we used the same adapted household survey, which was provided by those 
authors.   24 
Table 4.1: Total amount of benefits for CGE model by family type; 
changes between 2003 and 2005 (R$ mil) 
Families 
2003  2005  2005-2003 
Bolsa Família  BPC 
Bolsa 




Benefits in Total 
Family Income 
F1  777.344  675.171  1.829.805  1.418.757  1.796.048  4,31% 
F2  35.269  19.741  88.412  255.354  288.755  3,01% 
F3  616.145  302.187  1.250.466  410.307  742.439  5,05% 
F4  810.877  2.203.557  1.861.258  4.346.372  3.193.196  2,32% 
F5  131.450  653.335  276.218  336.645  -171.922  -0,11% 
F6  319.388  653.445  647.264  757.034  431.464  1,09% 
F7  336.965  575.066  635.454  288.837  12.259  0,00% 
F8  157.558  50.428  282.481  25.328  99.823  0,04% 
Total  3.185.000  5.132.934  6.871.361  7.838.638  6.392.065  0,57% 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from Federal Budget and SAM (2003) based model  
The  table  above  shows  the  differences  among  the  benefit  amounts  in  2005  and  2003.  The 
amount imputed in the 2003 model base year increased the transfers by R$ 6,392 million, which 
represents 0.57 percent of the total family income in the model. Separately, the program’s increase 
was approximately 116 percent for BF and 53 percent for BPC. Also, there was an improvement in 
the targeted group. The poorest families in the CGE model (F1, F2 and F3) increase their BF share 
from 44.9 percent (2003) to 46.1 percent (2005). Despite these improvements, the data show that 
the BPC targeting was much worse than that for the BF program (from 19.4% in 2003 to 26.6% in 
2005). 
The  effects  of  the  abovementioned  changes  are  evaluated  via  the  simulations,  henceforth 
referred as SIMU A and SIMU B. The only difference between them is whether the programs are 
financed  or  not,  before  the  shock.  In  SIMU  A,  the  government  expenditure  in  transfers  is  not 
financed  and  government  just  increases  its  expenditure  in  transfers.  This  choice  implies  that 
government is increasing its nominal deficit, which reduces total savings and investment. 
Program Budget Finance at SIMU B. The expenditure increase of BF and BPC was financed 
by the increase in federal government taxes. This choice was made in order to hold almost constant 
the nominal government deficit and its contribution to the total amount of savings at the CGE level. 
The justification for this policy arrangement can be explained by the “fiscal responsibility law”, which 
requires that every new expenditure must be explicitly financed at the budget law, which means at 
the moment the law is approved but before the new expenditure takes place. 
In  choosing  which  tax  we  should  increase,  we  reviewed  the  2005  federal  budget  data 
extensively to identify the specific tax sources that were financing the BF-BPC programs during that 
year. Table 4.2 summarizes the amounts of each federal tax source, their percentage composition, 
and the equivalent CGE tax as presented in the CGE model.   25 
Table 4.2: Programs’ tax sources in 2005 (R$ mil) 
Brazil Tax Source  Value  Composition  Equivalent tax in the CGE model 
Contribuição para Financiamento da Seguridade Social  
(COFINS:Code 153)  7.570.121  51.46% “COFINS” tax and its value added reform 
Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira  
(CPMF: Code 155)  5.265.907  35.80%  Direct taxes on firms and households 
Outros Impostos Diretos  
(Income Tax and other directed taxes)  993.630  6.75%  Direct taxes on firms and households 
Impostos sobre Produtos 
(Mix of Indirect Taxes)  445.959  3.03%  Indirect taxes on Revenue 
Contribuição Social sobre o Lucro das Pessoas Jurídicas 
(CSLL: Code 151)  418.667  2.85%  Direct taxes on firms and households 
Operações de Credito Externas - Em Moeda  
(code 148)  15.713  0.11%   
Total  14.710.000  100.00%   
 
From this table
36 we collected the financial share of each tax in the total increase of the 
programs’ expenditure (R$ 6.392.065.000). Thus, the specific CGE taxes below were increased in 
the following way:  
-  The direct taxes applied on gross income of the eight CGE families were increased 
by 2.2 percent. This tax increase was implemented through the coefficient th, in 
equation 27 of the model equation list (see Appendix A.2);
37 
-  The direct income taxes of the model firms were increased by 2.2 percent. This 
higher tax was implemented through the coefficient tf , in equation (28) of the model 
equation list (Appendix A.2); 
Apart from this, we partially replicate the simulation of the PIS-COFINS tax reform, which was 
implemented by federal government in the same period. From the total revenue generated by this 
reform, 27.5 percent was appropriated as funding for the programs
38. 
4.2. Macroeconomic Impacts 
Table 4.3 presents the macro results that formed the background for SIMU A and SIMU B. The 
analysis first focuses on results from SIMU B once it captures the effects of changes in transfers 
and in the taxes that were used to finance the transfers, while the results from SIMU A are reported 
to provide information on the impacts only from the changes in transfer programs. 
                                                       
36 The table’s total value (R$ 14.710.000) is equivalent to the sum of 2005 Bolsa Familia and BPC columns in 
Table 4.1. Briefly, the COFINS tax charges revenue, value-added, and imports. The CPMF tax was collected 
from all transactions through the banking system (however, it was revoked in 2008). The CSLL charges the 
net profit (after income tax). A more detailed data about the programs’ tax sources are presented in Appendix 
D of this report.  
37 Generally, an increase in the nominal tax rate on labor income should affect the labor supply. In this case 
however, the situation was different. The increase was just in the effective rate while the legal rate was held 
constant. This often occurred due to individual behavior changes.  Also, empirically the  Brazilian marginal 
income tax rate is very low for the great majority and there was an increase of just 2.2 % on average. 
38  In  this  reform,  the  PIS-COFINS  taxes  started  to  be  collected  by  two  regimes  (cumulative  and  non-
cumulative) associated with domestic flows and were also levied on imports. These changes were simulated 
in the CGE model and  are fully described in a paper by Cury and Coelho (2006). 
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Note: (*) Real percentage change from the CGE base year. (**) Lower than 0.01%. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
In general, the macro impacts were adverse since they induced a real GDP fall of 0.46 percent 
and an aggregate employment decrease of 0.48 percent, and generated a price index increase of 
0.65 percent. These adverse effects can mainly be attributed to the partial PIS-COFINS tax reform 
that was one of the financing sources of the transfer programs. The analysis of this tax reform done 
by Cury and Coelho (2006) provided similar results.  
The  taxation  of  the  firms’  value-added  (VA)  required  firms  to  either  earn  higher  marginal 
revenues or decrease marginal costs, which can be done by reducing the VA components. Since 
the capital is fixed by sector, this implies a lower labor demand that induces a decrease in wages, 
which subsequently reduces the available income. Particularly, the aggregate consumption fall is 
due to the decrease in the overall family income despite the rise in income among the poorest 
households due to the transfer’s increase. 
The  taxation  of  imports  imposed  by  the  fiscal  reform  increased  their  prices  in  the  domestic 
market and induced another adverse effect on aggregate consumption, once this had driven a rise 
in the composite commodities’ prices in the internal market. This relative increase of prices acts as 
an external shock and induces reductions of the household’s and firm’s demands.  
Exports fell due to the price-responsive behavior of external agents and the model’s external 
closure characteristics. First, the simulation induced an increase in prices of domestically produced 
commodities,  which  in  turn  caused  a  decrease  in  external  demand  for  Brazilian  commodities. 
Second, the rise in import prices and the reduction of internal absorption (activity) induced a fall in 
demand for imported commodities and in exports, which did not lead to a disequilibrium in the trade 
balance. 
The government deficit worsened by 7.88 percent, which showed that the simulated taxation 
changes were not enough to completely finance the total transfer costs. However, when comparing 
both simulations, it was noted that the government deficit decreased from 17.87 percent to 7.88 
Macroeconomics indicators  SIMU A (%)SIMU B (%) 
                  GDP  –0.02  –0.46 
                  Consumption  0.50  –0.35 
                  Investment  –1.42  –1.04 
                  Public Sector Deficit  +17.87  +7.38 
                  Exports  (**)  –0.84 
                  Imports  (**)  –1.07 
                  Employment  –0.11  –0.48 
                  Price Index  0.13  0.65   27 
percent. Despite the intention of full financing as designed in SIMU B, the government deficit was 
not held constant because the tax dead weight losses were incurred during the simulation.
39  
Finally,  the  comparison  between  simulations  demonstrated  the  isolated  effect  of  transfers 
without the tax increases (SIMU A). In this simulation, the GDP is practically stable. The same 
occurred  with  internal  absorption,  but  the  shock  caused  a  tradeoff  between  consumption  and 
investment, with the former increasing by 0.5 percent and the latter decreasing by 1.42 percent. 
This  fact  can  be  explained  by  the  increase  in  income  transfer  and  by  the  higher  public  deficit 
(+17.89 %), consequently reducing total savings. If there is no increase in other sources of savings, 
the  consequent  fall  in  investment  can  reduce  the  rate  of  economic  growth  in  the  near  future, 
postponing the negative economic effects. 
Besides the former adverse effect, overall SIMU A almost does not change the macro indicators 
in the short run. Therefore we can conclude that the adverse impacts of SIMU B are due to the 
simulated program’s financing structure. 
4.3. Impacts on Labor Market 
The changes in income transfer programs from 2003 to 2005 induced a slightly adverse effect 
on aggregate employment (–0.48%, according to Table 4.3) and on employment by labor type, as 
shown in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Change in employment from the base-year (%) 
  L1  L2  L3  L4  L5  L6  L7 
SIMU A  – 0.13  – 0.14  – 0.17  – 0.06  – 0.06  0,00  0,00 
SIMU B  – 0.85  – 0.47  – 0.47  – 0.28  – 0.23  0,00  0,00 
 
Note: L1-unskilled informal; L2-skilled informal; L3-formal with low skill; L4-formal with average skill; L5- formal with high skill; L6- low 
skilled public servant; L7- highly skilled public servant. 
The results show that employment fell for all categories of workers in the private sector only. 
Government employment does not change because the public sector does not follow the behavior 
of the private sector concerning hiring/firing people; by assumption, their employment levels are 
fixed and their labor market is adjusted only by means of wages.  
Among workers in the private sector, one can see two patterns. The effects would be more 
pronounced among those allocated in the informal market (L1 and L2) first and next among the less 
skilled ones in each (informal or formal) market. 
                                                       
39 We suppose that the government was acting ex-ante and was appropriating just resources to cover the 
programs’  budget.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  government  (ex-ante)  did  not 
estimate the probable tax losses. There remains the consideration that during that period, several different 
shocks were simultaneously changing the economy as a whole. 
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By our interpretation, with lower imports and an external closure implying fixed balance of goods 
and services there will be a pressure to overvalue the exchange rate that will tend to make exports 
more expensive, which will be reinforced by an increase in input prices used to produce exported 
goods. The sectors in which exports are more sensible to price changes are the most traditional 
ones. Thus, by exporting less, there would be a tendency for these sectors to produce less and, 
therefore, to employ less workers, especially the less skilled ones.  
The decrease in employment of more skilled workers is due to the fall in the output of sectors 
that produce goods with higher technological content, thus effectively decreasing the demand for 
this  kind  of  worker  (as  employed  in  automobiles,  auto  parts,  electronic,  electrical,  and 
pharmaceutical industries). Given this fact, there is probably a fall in the consumption of families 
with higher income. 
Table 4.5 presents the impacts on real wages by labor type. Recall that the CGE model takes 
the  assumption  of rigid sectoral  wage  differentials,  thus the  wage  structure  can  only  react to a 
certain type of labor. As a consequence, the changes reported in table 4.5 are for each type of 
worker without any sectoral desegregation. 
Table 4.5: Change in the average real wage from the base-year (%) 
  L1  L2  L3  L4  L5  L6  L7 
SIMU A  + 0,32  – 0,12  – 0,04  – 0,07  – 0,09  – 0,04  – 0,01 
SIMU B  – 1,77  – 0.96   – 1,52  – 0,90  – 1,61  – 1,66  – 1,62 
 
Note: L1-unskilled informal; L2-skilled informal; L3-formal with low skill; L4-formal with average skill; L5- formal with high skill; L6- low 
skilled public servant; L7- highly skilled public servant. 
Note that the general effect is a real wage fall. The wage of informal workers (L1 and L2) would 
fall relatively more compared to the wage of formal workers with similar skill levels. The higher 
reduction in public servants’ earnings is due to the assumption that the equilibrium in their labor 
market is almost exclusively achieved by means of wage adjustments. 
Table 4.6 shows the effects on payroll by type of worker (total labor income) representing the 
former  quantity  and  price  effects  together.  They  are  stronger  among  the  less  skilled  workers, 
especially for those allocated in the informal market. 
Table 4.6: Changes in real payroll from the base-year (%) 
  L1  L2  L3  L4  L5  L6  L7 
SIMU A  + 0,19  – 0,25  – 0,21  – 0,13  – 0,14  – 0,04  – 0,01 
SIMU B  –2.62  –1.43  –1.99  –1.18  –1.84  –1.66  –1.62 
 
Note: L1-unskilled informal; L2-skilled informal; L3-formal with low skill; L4-formal with average skill; L5- formal with high skill; L6- low 
skilled public servant; L7- highly skilled public servant. 
These effects on payroll are due mainly to the fall in real wages, once the impacts of changes in 
transfer programs on employment are lower than the real wage changes for each kind of worker.   29 
Again, the comparison between simulations shows that the transfer programs themselves practically 
do not cause any significant adverse effect. Even the informal unskilled worker (L1) shows a labor 
income improvement, derived from the fact that there is a production reallocation in favor of more 
intensive labor sectors. On the other hand, the increase in taxes to finance the programs lead to 
adverse effects through changes in the relative prices and a less efficient resource allocation with 
higher unemployment. 
Finally, it is important to stress that the convergence procedures affect the final labor market 
equilibrium. Concerning these effects on payroll therefore, the convergence solution of the CGE and 
the MS models show that changes in the transfer programs induce general equilibrium effects that 
initially concentrate on wage (price effects) and, due to the iterative process, are partially reallocated 
to employment impacts (quantity effects). 
Table 4.7 illustrates the process described in the previous paragraph through the evolution of 
model variables during SIMU B. In the first line, we represent the real wage, price index, and GDP in 
the first simulation round. In the second line, the same variables are presented for the last round of 
SIMU B, which is the source of the results reported in this section. For the wage, we realized that 
the  iteration  changes  the  results  considerably,  lowering  the  impact  on  wages.  The  price  index 
increases  while  GDP  practically  does  not  change,  aided  by  the  employment  increase,  which 
confirms that the model integration leads to a new set of results. 
Table 4.7: Differences between first and last SIMU B rounds – selected variables (% ) 
  wage L1  wage L2  wage L3  wage L4  wage L5  pindex  GDP 
First round simu B  – 2,16  – 1,39  – 1,76  – 1,29  – 1,93  0.56  – 0.41 
Last round simu B  – 1,77  – 0.96   – 1,52  – 0,90  – 1,61  0,65  – 0,46 
 
4.4. Impacts on Income Distribution 
Table 4.8 shows the impacts of changes in transfer programs on inequality indicators. In 
general, the results confirm the important role of transfer programs in Brazil’s recent inequality fall.
40 
Table 4.8: Inequality indicators from household per capita income (base year 2003) 
Inequality 
Indicators 
BasicYear  SIMU A  SIMU B 
Original  Results**  Change  Results**  Change 
Gini Index  0.5930  0.5908  – 0.37%  0.5902  – 0.48% 
Theil-T Index  0.7213  0.7163  – 0.69%  0.7161  – 0.72% 
Source: from the CGE-MS integration model. (base year: 2003 PNAD survey) 
                                                       
40 The book published in Brazil and edited by IPEA (Barros et al, 2007d) has several chapters aligned with this 
view.    30 
Focusing on Gini index changes, the fall of –0.48 percent (SIMU B) is slightly lower than the 
ones  reported  by  other  studies  that  have  evaluated  the  importance  of transfer  programs  to  the 
decrease in inequality using partial equilibrium/decomposition analysis. Barros et al (2007c) found 
that 22.9 percent of the total Gini decrease between 2001 and 2005 was due to BF and BPC. In the 
same period, these authors reported a total decrease in the Gini index of    –2.6 percent. Therefore, 
the decrease displayed in table 4.7 accounts for approximately 14 percent (SIMU A) and 19 percent 
(SIMU B) of the total fall in inequality during that period.  
The simulations intended to capture the effects of changes in transfer programs from 2003 to 
2005 in a general equilibrium environment. Although the period is different, we found evidence that 
just the transfer programs (SIMU A) had lower effects on inequality than those reported by other 
studies  that  had  evaluated  the  distributive  effects  of  these  programs.  In  the  case  of  SIMU  B 
however, the effect is very similar. These differences are due to fact that the changes in transfers 
and in their financing taxes had induced a decrease in employment and an increase in prices that 
are not well captured by partial equilibrium analysis. It is also important to stress that the taxation 
changes related to the programs contributed to reduce inequality but left some adverse effects as 
shown below. 
Despite the previous comments, we must be careful when comparing these results with previous 
analyses. As stressed before, they have methodological and simulation design differences, although 
we tried to replicate these earlier experiments.  
Table 4.9 shows the impacts of changes in transfer programs on per head family income. The 
changes in programs had a slightly adverse effect on the national average household income which 
was – 0.18 percent in SIMU A, but was magnified to – 0.81% when the changes in taxation related 
to the programs’ expansion were considered in SIMU B. In both simulations, the positive strong 
effects on the three poorest families were primarily due to the increase in transfer amounts for them. 
In  SIMU  B  however,  the  effects  were  a  little  lower  for  each  of  these  same  family  types.  This 
happens  because  one  of  the  main  resources  for  expanding  these  programs  was  through  an 
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Table 4.9: Change in household income from the base-year (%) 
Average household 
income 
Original  SIMU A  SIMU B 
Values (R$)  Values (R$)  ￿Change  Values (R$)  Change 
National average  432.36  431.59   -0.18%  428.84   -0.81% 
Family 1 (F1)  43.88  45.89   4.58%  45.76   4.28% 
Family 2 (F2)  70.20  74.90   6.70%  74.89   6.69% 
Family 3 (F3)  46.87  47.89   2.17%  47.78   1.94% 
Family 4 (F4)  166.42  168.19   1.06%  167.67   0.75% 
Family 5 (F5)  303.65  302.57   –0.36%  301.23   –0.80% 
Family 6 (F6)  191.94  192.31   0.19%  191.76   –0.09% 
Family 7 (F7)  696.64  693.84   –0.40%  689.33   –1.05% 
Family 8 (F8)  3,015.14  2,998.08   –0.57%  2,972.50   –1.41% 
Note: F1 – poor urban families headed by active individuals; F2 – poor urban families headed by non-active individuals; F3 – poor rural 
families; F4 – urban families with low average income; F5 – urban families with medium income; F6 – rural families with medium income; 
F7 – families with high average income; F8 – families with high income.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
For the same reason, the effects of the programs’ expansion on income of richer families (F7 
and  F8)  were  already  negative  in  the  first  simulation  (SIMU  A)  and  were  magnified  when  the 
changes in taxation were considered.  
The effects of the transfer programs’ expansion that positively impacts the income of the poorest 
family types are reflected in SIMU A. This simulation also captures systemic effects induced from 
these programs, as shown in sections 4.2 and 4.4. Besides capturing these effects, SIMU B also 
shows the additional negative impacts from the general taxation, and the above results show the 
effects on the richest families (F7 and F8). 
This helps to understand the improvement of the Gini index in SIMU B in relation to SIMU A. 
Aside from capturing the income increase of the poorest families, it also captures the fall in income 
of the richest families due to the taxation. 
4.5. Impacts on Poverty  
The effects of the transfer programs on poverty are presented in table 4.10. Based on observed 
and simulated income per head household, we calculate three poverty indicators: Proportion of Poor 
(P0), Income Gap (P1) and Severity of Poverty (P2). To calculate these indicators, we used values 
for September 2005 estimated by Barros et al (2007b) and we deflated these to September 2003 




   32 
Table 4.10: Poverty indicators - PNAD 2003 
Poverty Indicators 
Base year  SIMU A   SIMU B 
Results*  Results  Change  Results  Change 
Poverty Line (Line = R$ 143,70) 
P0  0.3299  0.3256  –1.29%  0.3271  –0.84% 
P1  0.1599  0.1579  –1.26%  0.1593  –0.38% 
P2  0.1061  0.1047  –1.28%  0.1060  –0.08% 
Extreme Poverty Lines (Line = R$ 71,84) 
P0  0.1485  0.1473  –0.83%  0.1485  0.01% 
P1  0.0777  0.0766  –1.38%  0.0778  0.18% 
P2  0.0578  0.0569  –1.52%  0.0580  0.40% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
The general reduction in poverty indicators (P0, P1 and P2) shows that the changes just in 
transfer programs (SIMU A) had positive effects on poverty and on extreme poverty. Although the 
impacts are positive, they are lower than the income of the poorest families showed in table 4.8 
because the transfers are concentrated on families that receive them. On the other hand, some poor 
families lose their labor income due to the unemployment generated in the economy 
From  the  results  in  table  4.10  we  also  see  that  the  impacts  of  programs  on  poverty  were 
reduced by the changes in taxation conducted to finance their expansion (SIMU B); that is, the 
changes  in  taxation  generated  some  adverse  impacts  in  the  markets  that  affected  the  poor 
population and, in a more intensive way, the extremely poor individuals. As we have seen previously 
in section 4.4, the impacts on employment were stronger among the less skilled workers (L1 and 
L3) and the informal workers (L1 and L2). Despite these impacts, their wages have also decreased 
significantly.  These  workers  are  prevalent  among  the  poorest  families,  which  also  show  a  high 
dependence  on  labor  income.  Therefore,  despite  the  increase  in  the  received  benefits,  some 
families experienced adverse effects from job losses and wage reduction that were induced by the 
changes in taxation. 
Specifically in the case of SIMU B, the programs’ expansion did not have an impact on the 
extreme poverty level. However, the income gap and severity of extreme poverty have worsened. 
One fact that helps to understand this phenomenon is the deterioration of non-labor income due to 
the price increase, which especially affected the family F2, whose income is basically derived from 
social security benefits.  
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
In the last two sections of this report, we presented the methodological approach and the main 
results of the simulations. From the methodology, it was emphasized that the general equilibrium 
effects cannot be neglected, not only to evaluate the effects brought by the transfer increases, but 
mainly  to  address  the  economic  impacts  originated  in the tax  structure that finances  this social 
expenditure.  Without  the  CGE  component  of  this  integrated  approach,  many  economic  facts, 
reported in the simulation results, could not be identified.   33 
On the other hand, the MS model allows the individualization and the treatment of individuals 
and families. In view of this, we implemented the individual imputation of the transfer benefits and 
the  respective  labor  supply  reaction,  whose  system  inside  the  MS  model  greatly  improved  the 
treatment of the labor market. Also, without the MS model, we could not generate more realistic 
results about poverty and inequality than those obtained with models that include representative 
agents. 
Then there is the integration between these models (CGE and MS). Throughout the interaction 
in the labor market, the employee’s reactions to wage movements were better captured, allowing for 
a set of price and quantity adjustments with economic consequences for the entire system. Without 
these, the simulation effects would be more concentrated on quantity adjustments that rarely fit the 
empirical data of this type of shock. 
The aim of the simulations presented here was to investigate the role of the two most important 
Brazilian  cash  transfer  programs  in  reducing  inequality.  Our  main  objective  was  to  provide 
information that could help answer the project’s main research questions: What are the impacts of 
the current income transfer programs on poverty/inequality? To what extent does each program 
accomplish  its  objective  of  poverty/inequality  reduction?  What  would  be  the  impacts  of  these 
programs if they have alternative policy designs? 
Adopting the same strategy as the presentation of our results, we emphasized the impacts of 
SIMU B, which in our opinion can better represent the costs and benefits of the analyzed policies, 
since the simulation captures the effects of changes in transfers and in taxes that were used to 
finance them. 
The macro results that formed the background for both simulations showed that, in general, the 
impacts  were  adverse  for  several  macro  indicators,  among  them  GDP,  employment,  and  price 
index. However, it is important to emphasize that the adverse results came mainly from the tax 
increases instead of the transfer policies. Also, the identification of this fact is a direct contribution of 
the study’s integrated approach. 
Starting with the first question, the results confirmed the importance of Bolsa Família and BPC 
programs for the recent reduction in income inequality in Brazil. The results of SIMU B showed that 
practically 1/5 of the fall in inequality between 2003 and 2005 can be attributed to the adopted 
policies.  Also,  the  results  were  very  similar  to  those  reported  by  other studies  that  used  partial 
equilibrium/decomposing analysis. However, taxation alone (as shown in SIMU B) had a major role 
in this process. Again, this finding is another result derived from our methodology. 
The  results  were  also  positive  for  the  poverty  indicators.  However,  the  transfer  policy 
contribution, especially in SIMU B, had a smaller impact than its inequality effect. The transfers itself 
(SIMU A) generated positive impacts, but the changes in taxation to finance program expansion   34 
practically offset the former effect, particularly in the case of extreme poverty indicators. The family 
income  components  that  contributed  to  this  process  include  labor  income  through  higher 
unemployment, and non-labor income through the fall of social security benefits in real values.  
In general, the results also demonstrated that the two analyzed programs have achieved their 
objective of reducing poverty and inequality. However, the simulation data in section 4.1 showed 
that Bolsa Família targeted its beneficiaries better, concentrating its benefits on poor families. On 
the other hand, BPC does not show the same concentration pattern. As shown in Appendix C and D 
however, the main problem in this regard lies in the program administration that has not correctly 
enforced the criteria established by its legal instruments. 
Finally, we did not formally exercise simulations with alternative simulation designs because the 
research results indicated that there are other issues more important than the “benefits alternative” 
models. This fact was also reinforced by the minor impacts of the programs’ current design on labor 
supply. On the other hand, it became evident that the taxation structure of the transfer programs 
plays an important role in the final welfare impacts. In our opinion, this issue should deserve more 
attention in a policy research agenda that could explore different strategies to finance the programs 
instead  of  cutting  some  government  expenditure  that  neither  improves  income  distribution  nor 
reduces poverty.    35 
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Appendix A: CGE Model 
A.1. The CGE Model – complementary description  
A.1.1. The Product Supply 
Foreign product supply is modeled as being totally elastic,
41 while sectoral domestic supply is 
represented by a three-step nested production function with three types of inputs: labor, capital and 
intermediate  inputs.
42  First,  amounts  of  types  of  labor  (Fl),  given  by  the  first  order  firm’s  profit 
maximization  conditions  are  combined  in  a  composite  labor  (Ldi)  for  each  sector  i,  by  a  Cobb-






b   (A.2.1) 
where  il b  is the share of each type of labor: unskilled informal (L1), skilled informal (L2), formal 
with low skill (L3), formal with average skill (L4), formal with high skill (L5), public servant with low 
skill (L6) and public servant with high skill (L7).
44 
Second, in each sector i, aggregated labor (Ldi) and capital (Ki) 
45 are associated by a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function to obtain the production level (Xi): 
( ) [ ]
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where 
D
i a  is the CES shift parameter,  i a  is the i sector’s labor share in the production value 
and  ip r  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. 
Finally, in the third step the various intermediate input levels (INTi) are obtained by a Leontief 
production function (e.g., fixed proportion to sector j total product, Xj):
46 
∑ = j j ij i X a INT *   (A,2.3) 
where aij is the technical coefficient of input j in sector i.  
                                                       
41 Thus, Brazilian demands for imported goods are fully satisfied without facing external supply constraints. 
42 The model represents the 42 sectors of activities listed in Appendix B. 
43  This  means  that  an  identical  increase  of  every  type  of  worker  results  in  an  identical  increase  of  the 
aggregate worker. 
44 Also, there are  two more types of employers that  are treated as labor and  enter in the Cobb-Douglas 
aggregation.  
45 The model closure adopted in the simulations determines that the sectoral levels of capital are fixed.  
46 It is worth mentioning that Devarajan et al (1991) makes use of only the first and third steps, by combining 
capital with labor and value added with intermediate inputs in this order.   39 
Domestic producers react to the relative prices in domestic and international markets and the 
domestic output is divided by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function with imperfect 
substitution between products sold in these markets: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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where  i X ,  i E  and  i D  are, respectively, the domestic sector i’s total output, exported volume and 
sales  to  internal  market. 
T
i a   and  i g   are  model’s  parameters  and  it r   is  the  elasticity  of 
transformation.
47 
A.1.2. Demand for products 
A.1.2.1. Families 
Families  are  classified  according  to  per  head  household  income,  level  of  urbanization  and 
household head characteristics: poor urban families headed by active individual (F1), poor urban 
families  headed  by  non-active  individual  (F2),  poor  rural  families  (F3),  urban  families  with  low 
average income (F4), urban families with medium income (F5), rural families with medium income 
(F6), families with high average income (F7), and families with high income (F8).  
They choose commodities’ consumption levels to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint 
according to a Cobb-Douglas functional form (similar to the production function presented earlier).
 48 
Families and firms demand domestic and imported goods as imperfect substitutes that differ 
according to their source (domestic or external), as proposed by Armington (1969), and their utility 
levels are measured (in product quantity) by a CES function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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where Mi is the imported volume of good i and Di is the consumption of the domestic good i. 
    and i i a c d  are parameters, while  ic r  is the Armington elasticity of substitution between Di and Mi.
49 
Finally, Qi indicates the utility derived from the consumption of good i.
50 
                                                       
47  There  are  no  empirical  estimates  of  Brazilian  export  elasticities  using  a  CET  structure  for  a  highly 
disaggregated sectoral specification. Therefore, it was adopted from the same procedure used in Cury (1998, 
pp. 112-113), which departed from the elasticities estimated by Roland-Holst et al (1994) to the American 
economy.  
48 Actually, this utility maximization can happen along the consumers’ lifetime. From the point of view of most 
practical applications, the maximization is on the goods and services available in a given period.  
49 These elasticity values were estimated for the same sectors considered in the model by Tourinho et al 
(2002). 
50  It  can  be  interpreted  as  the  quantity  of  a  hypothetical  composite  good  that  would  be  demanded  by 
consumers.   40 
The external agents demand domestic goods, reacting to changes in relative prices as well. 
Similarly to the import demand function, the exports demand arises from a CES utility function that 
represents the imperfect substitution between products from the external regions and Brazil. 
A.1.2.2. Firms 
Firms  demand  commodities  to  satisfy  their  production  requirements  of  intermediate  inputs 
according  to  the  technical  coefficients  from  the  input-output  matrix.  Due  to  the  static  nature  of 
accumulation in the capital market, investments are only important for product demand.  
Similar to consumption, investment is characterized as the purchases of certain goods and can 
be considered as a final consumption undertaken by firms. The total savings represents this amount 
of resources and a share of it corresponds to investment in stocks of finished goods, while the 
remaining parcel represents the net investment required to expand production. The first share is 
defined  based  on  a  fixed  proportion  to  the  sectoral  output,  while  the  second  is  distributed 
exogenously among the sectors, reflecting information from the input-output tables (goods by sector 
of origin). 
It is considered that investment goods are being produced but not used as increments of capital 
stocks.  Thus,  the  model  closure  is  closer  to  a  medium-run  type:  constant  capital  stock,  price 
flexibility and existence of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.  
A.1.2.3. Government  
The  Government  consumption  (GC)  is  derived  from  maximization  of  a  Cobb-Douglas  utility 
function  subject  to  the  budgetary  constraint  corresponding  to  the  total  expenditure  that  is  fixed 
according to the total amount registered for the base year. 
A.2. Full List of Equations and Variables in the CGE Model 
A.2.1. The Price Block 
1) Pim = PWim . (1 + tim + txcim + ticim) . R 
2) Pie = PWie . (1 + tie) . R 
3) Piq = (Pid . Di + Pim . Mi) / Qi 
4) Pix = (Pid . Di + Pie . Ei)/ Xi 
5) Piv = (Pix *{1 – tix – tisoc – tipriv – tiprivmg – tivalix – tivalcx – [tixc . ((Pix . Xi – Pie . Ei) / Pix . 
Xi)]} – Sj  Pjq . aji) / (1 + tivalc + tivali) 
6) Pik = ∑j Pjq . bji 
7) PINDEX = ∑i  pwtsi  . Piq   41 
A.2.2. The Block of Production or Quantities 
8) Ldi = Õ l Fil **
bli 
9) Xi = ai
D . [ai . Ldi
**(rip-1)/(rip) + (1 – ai).Ki
** (rip-1)/(rip)]
 ** (rip)/(rip – 1) 
10) INTi = ∑j aij . Xj 
11)  WFl  .  WFDISTil  .  Fil  =  (Piv  –  mgi).  bli  .  ai  .  Xi  .Ldi 
**(rip  –  1)/(rip)  /[ai  .  Ldi
**(rip  –  1)/(rip)  +  
(1 – ai ). K i
**(rip – 1)/(rip)] 
12) Xi = ai
T . [gi . Ei
**(rit + 1)/(rit) + (1 – gi).Di
**(rit + 1)/(rit)]
 ** (rit + 1’)/(rit) 
 
13) Ei = Di .{[Pie . (1 –  gi)/ Pid . gi]**[
(1/ rit) – 1] 
14) Ei = econi .[PWie/pwsei]** 
(–hi) 
15) Qi = ai
c . [di . Mi
**(ric – 1)/(ric) + (1 – di). Di
**(ric – 1)/(ric)] 
** (ric)/(ric – 1) 
 
16) Mi = Di [Pid . di /Pim . (1 – di)]
** (ric) 
17) VALADDi = (Piv .(1 + tivalc + tivali) .Xi) + (Xi . Pix .ti privmg)) 
18) WRl= WFl / (PINDEX ) 
19) log(WRl) = a + rb . log(Ul) 
A.2.3. The Flow of Income Block  
20) Yl = Si Wfl . WFDISTil . Fil + Sinst INSTWGinst . R  
21) YFCTRl = Si Wfl . WFDISTil . Fil  
22) KINCi = Piv . Xi . (1 + tivalc + tivali) – Sl  WFl . WFDISTil . Fil 
23) KINCSMi = smcoefi .KINCi 
24) YHh = Sl ehl.Yl + eh,smfirm.YDSFIRM + Sho qhho .YDh   + qh,firm . YDFIRM + PINDEX . gtranph . 
gtrant + PINDEX.strant(h) + remith(h) . R  
25) YFIRM = Si( KINCi- KINCSMi ) + Si tipriv . Pix . Xi + Si tiprivmg . Pix . Xi+ Sho qfirm,ho .YDho + 
PINDEX. gtranp(firm). gtrant + t(firms,w) .R + intflf(firm) .YDFIRM + intflf(smfirm) .YDSFIRM 
26) YSMFIRM = Si KINCSMi + PINDEX. gtranpi(smfirm). gtrant 
27) YDh = (1 – th – tsoceh – qfirm,h ). YHh  – R. intflh(h)  
28) YDFIRM = (1 – tf – pinstax(firm)). YFIRM – R. intfli(firm) – DEPREC – intflf(firm) .YDFIRM 
29) YDSMFIRM = (1 – t(smfirm) – pinstax(smfirm)). YSMFIRM 
30) TARIFF = Si pwim . Mi . (tim + timxcm + timicm). R 
31) INDTAX = Si Pix .Xi .tix + Si tix .[Pix . Xi – Pie . Ei ] + Si (tivalc + tivali) .VALADDNEW 
32) EXPSUB = Si Pwie .Ei .tie .R 
33) DIRTAX = Sh thh.YHh + tf.YFIRM + tsmfirm. YSMFIRM    42 
34) DEPREC =Si depri .Pik .Ki 
35) HHSAV = Sh MPSh . YDh 
36) GR = TARIFF + INDTAX + DIRTAX + gfbor. R + SOCBAL – EXPSUB 
37) SAVING = HHSAV + GOVSAV + DEPREC + mpsi(firms) .YDFIRM + FSAV .R 
38)  SOCBAL  =  SI  tsoci.Pix.Xi  +  pinstax(firm)  YFIRM  +  pinstax(smfirm)  YSMFIRM  +  PINDEX. 
gtranpi(prev).gtrant – PINDEX . Sh strant(h) 
39) GOVSAV = GR – Si Piq . GDi – gtrant .PINDEX – R.gfdebser 
A.2.4. The Block of Income and Expenditures 
40) CDi .Piq = bih .Sh (1-MPSh) [1– Sho qhoh – ihcoef ( firm,h) ] YDh 
41) GDi = bi
G. GDTOT 
42) DSTi = dstri.Xi 
43) FXDINV = INVEST – Si Piq .DSTi 
44) Pik .DKi = kshri . FXDINV 
45) IDi = Sj bij . Dkj 
A.2.5. The Block of Market Equilibrium 
46) SAVING = INVEST 
47) Qi = INTi + CDi + GDi + IDi  + DSTi 
48) Si pwim .Mi+ intfli(firm) + Sh intflh(h) +gfdebser = Si Pwie .Ei +Sh remith(h)+ Sl remithl(l) + remiti(firm) 
+gfbor – FSAV 
49) Si Fil = (1- Ul).FSl 
50) RGDP =  Si ( CDi  + GDi  + IDi  + DSTi + Ei - Mi) 
A.2.6. The Block of Identities and Model Closures 
51) R.FX = R.L  
52) FSAV.FX = FSAV.L 
53) MPS.FX(h) = MPS.L(h) 
54) GDTOT.FX = GDTOT.L 
55) FS.FX(l) = FS.L(l) 
56) U.FX(l) = U.L(l) 
57) WFDIST.FX (i,L) = WFDIST.L(i,L) 
58) K.FX( i ) = K.L( i )   43 
A.2.7. List of Variables in the model Equations 
Variable  Description  Variable  Description 
CDi   Consumption of households  Pie   Price of exported goods 
CG   Government consumption  Pik   Price of capital goods 
DEPREC  Capital depreciation  Pim   Price (in R$) of imported goods 
Di   Domestic goods sold internally  PINDEX   Model price index 
DIRTAX   Total direct taxes  Piq   Price of composite goods 
DKi  
Real sector investment per sector of destination 
of capital goods  Piv   Price of net value added 
DST   Investment in stocks  Pix   Price of goods produced internally 
Ei   Exports  Pwie   Price in dollars of exported goods 
EXPSUB  Export Subsidies  pwim   Price in dollars of imported goods 
Fil   Labor sectoral demand per type of labor  pwsei   Prices of goods produced abroad 
Fl   Labor demand per type of labor  Qi   Composite product supply in the domestic market 
FSAV 
Balance of the capital account in the Balance of 
Payments  R   Exchange rate 
FSl   Labor supply of each type of labor  RGDP   Real GDP 
FXDINV   Investment in fixed capital  SAVING   Total savings 
GDPVA   Value Added (in market prices) GDP  SOCBAL   Social security balance 
GG   Total government consumption  TARIFF  Import tariffs 
GOVSAV  Government savings  Ul   Unemployment rate per type of labor 
GR  Central government revenues  VALADDi   Net value-added by sector 
HHSAV  Household savings  WFDISTil   Wage differential per type of labor and sector 
IDi  
Investment per sector of origin of capital goods 
(producer of the goods)  WFl   Wage per type of labor 
INDTAX  Total indirect taxes  WRl   Real wage per type of labor 
INTi  Intermediate goods  Xi   Domestic production 
INVEST   Total investment  YDFIRM   Large firms available income 
Ki   Capital stock by sector  YDh   Household available income 
KINCi   Capital income by sector  YDSMFIRM   Small firms available income 
KINCSMi   Small capital income by sector  YFCTR   Gross labor income (over sector) by labor type 
LDi   Aggregate sectoral labor by type of labor  YFIRM   Large firms gross income 
MPS   Marginal propensity to save  YHh   Household income 
Mi  Imports  Yl   Gross labor income (over sector) by labor type 
Pid   Price of domestic goods sold Internally  YSMFIRM   Small firms gross income 
 
Appendix B: The Models’ Data Bases and Econometrics Estimates 
B.1. CGE Database  
Almost all data used in the CGE model and simulations were derived from a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM–2003), which contains all the quantity and price information in 2003 (the model’s base 
year).  Besides,  all  the  model’s  coefficients  and  parameters  obtained  by  the  model  calibration 
process are calculated from this data matrix, whose description can be found in Cury et al (2006). It 
deserves mention that ithis SAM was not made based on new Brazilian National Accounts 2000 
series released in March 2007 by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, 2007). 
Table B.1 describes the 42 sectors of the CGE. 
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Table B.1 - - - - The 42 sectors in the CGE model 
IBGE-NA 
Code  Sectors descriptions 
01  Agriculture 
02  Mining (except fuels) 
03  Extraction of oil and natural gas, coal and other fuels 
04  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
05  Steel 
06  Non-ferrous metallurgy 
07  Manufacture of other metallurgic products 
08  Manufacture and maintenance of machines and tractors 
10  Manufacture of electrical material and equipment 
11  Manufacture of electronic material and equipment 
12  Manufacture of cars, trucks and buses 
13  Manufacture of other vehicles, parts and accessories 
14  Sawmills and manufacture of wood and furniture 
15  Manufacture of paper and printing 
16  Rubber industry 
17  Manufacture of non-petrochemical chemical elements 
18  Refining of petroleum and petrochemical industry 
19  Manufacture of various chemicals 
20  Manufacture of pharmaceuticals and perfumery 
21  Processing industry of plastic 
22  Textile industry 
23  Manufacture of articles clothing and accessories 
24  Manufacture of footwear and leather goods and furs 
25  Coffee industry 
26  Processing of products of vegetable origin, including tobacco 
27  Slaughter and meat preparation 
28  Cooling and preparation of milk and dairy 
29  Sugar industry 
30  Manufacture and refining of vegetable oils and fats for food 
31  Other food and drink industries 
32  Miscellaneous industry 
33  Industrial services of public utility 
34  Construction 
35  Retail trade 
36  Transports 
37  Communications 
38  Financial institutions 
39  Services provided to families 
40  Business services 
41  Rental properties 
42  Government 
43  Private non-market services 
Source: Cury et al (2006). 
B.2. Microsimulation Database  
The  database  for  the  microsimulation  consists  of  the  sample  of  almost  384,834  individuals 
distributed in 117,010 households in the 2003 PNAD. Each of the individuals in active age (over 10 
years  old)  was  classified  according  to  the  11  types  of  factors  derived  from  the  CGE  model. 
However, only individuals in active age belonging to the factors L1 to L5 were considered in the 
CGE-MS integration; that is, those individuals who have their wages paid in the private sector as   45 
their main income source.
51 Thus, the sample had 106,590 observations that represent 48,742,853 
individuals that were classified as occupied and unoccupied, as shown in table B.2. 
One of the main difficulties in making the CGE-MS integration work is convergence. For this 
convergence to be successful it was appropriate to make the two databases have the same values. 
Thus, the weights of individuals were multiplied by a factor (reweighting), so that the PNAD data 
base reflected the CGE model data. Table B.2 presents the results of this reweighting for employed 
and unemployed people. 











CGE model data  







ployed  Total  Emplo-
yed 
Unem-




L1  Unskilled 
informal  12.890  1.567  14.457  10,8%  11.714  1.418  13.132  10,8%  0,9088  0,9052 
L2  Skilled 
informal  5.694  952  6.646  14,3%  5.264  878  6.143  14,3%  0,9245  0,9226 
L3  Formal with 





9.208  854  10.062  8,5%  8.331  774  9.105  8,5%  0,9048  0,9062 
L5  Formal with 
high skill  2.211  95  2.306  4,1%  2.063  88  2.152  4,1%  0,9334  0,9238 
Totals  43.926  4.817  48.743  9,9%  39.647  8.537  87.788  9,7%       
Source: PNAD 2003, CGE model data base 
B.3. Econometric Estimates  
The first part of the microsimulation process is the computation of the labor supply equation 
(3.2.1). The entire PNAD sample was considered for this phase. From the reweighed database, 
equations (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) were estimated using the two-stage method proposed by Heckman 
(1979) for  three  demographic  groups: men,  women  head  of  household  with  children,  and  other 
women.  Table  B.3  contains  the  econometric  estimates  by  the  system  equation,  including  the 
coefficients and their standard errors to 5 percent of significance, as well as the inverse of the Mills’s 
ratio,  ( ) z l ˆ .  From  these  estimates  were  computed  the  potential  hours  of  work  necessary  for 
completing step 2 of the microsimulation process.  
The second part of the microsimulation process is the computation of the reservation wages and 
the  new  occupation  ratio.  For this  phase,  only  the factors  L1 to  L5  were  considered.  From the 
reweighed data base, equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) were estimated using the two-stage method 
proposed  by  Heckman  (1979).  Table  B.4  contains  the  econometric  estimates  by  this  system 
                                                       
51 Individuals in active age who belong to the factors L6 and L7 (public sector) were not considered in the 
microsimulation, because their wages are not regulated by the market. Furthermore, the employment levels of 
the factors are rigid in accordance with Brazilian law (see Section 3.2).   46 
equation and the benefits shocks, changing the log i B  that corresponds to the Bolsa Família and 
BPC amounts of 2003, to log
*
i B  that corresponds to the benefits amounts of 2005.
52 
Table B.3: Results of labor supply estimates 
 
Coefficients 
Group: j = 1 (Men) 
Coefficients 
Group: j = 2 (Women w/ children) 
Coefficients 
Group: j = 3 (Women) 
Labor supply regression equation: hi     
log w  -2,3275 **  -4,4850 **  -2,5876 ** 
  (0,0567)  (0,1793)  (0,0873) 
log B  -0,0893  -1,5730 **  -1,3203 ** 
  (0,1011)  (0,1373)  (0,0778) 
log Q  -0,2655 **  -0,2435 **  -0,1505 ** 
  (0,0161)  (0,0518)  (0,0371) 
Educ  0,1386 **  0,6143 **  0,5238 ** 
  (0,0129)  (0,0375)  (0,0199) 
Age  0,9658 **  1,0852 **  0,6261 ** 
  (0,0241)  (0,0858)  (0,0367) 
age
2  -0,0112 **  -0,0138 **  -0,0089 ** 
  (0,0003)  (0,0011)  (0,0005) 
Famsize  -0,1423 **  -0,1175  -0,3811 ** 
  (0,0285)  (0,1154)  (0,0463) 
Da  -0,6749 **  -5,6864 **  -9,2074 ** 
  (0,1275)  (0,5287)  (0,2064) 
Constant  34,4863 **  32,8253 **  41,7028 ** 
  (0,4924)  (1,7713)  (0,7587) 
Selection equation: Pr(Si = 1 | z)   
log w  2,6519 **  2,6359 **  2,7232 ** 
  (0,0271)  (0,0454)  (0,0281) 
log B  -0,0938 **  0,0870 **  0,0833 ** 
  (0,0159)  (0,0140)  (0,0065) 
log Q  -0,0728 **  -0,0582 **  -0,0259 ** 
  (0,0044)  (0,0076)  (0,0048) 
Educ  -0,0494 **  -0,0424 **  -0,0221 ** 
  (0,0026)  (0,0048)  (0,0020) 
Age  -0,0122 **  0,0429 **  0,0464 ** 
  (0,0043)  (0,0089)  (0,0033) 
age
2  0,0001 *  -0,0005 **  -0,0005 ** 
  (0,0001)  (0,0001)  (0,0000) 
Famsize  0,0660 **  0,0571 **  0,0181 ** 
  (0,0055)  (0,0130)  (0,0043) 
Da  1,4757 **  0,9410 **  1,2707 ** 
  (0,0248)  (0,0488)  (0,0160) 
Constant  -1,8483 **  -2,8367 **  -3,2942 ** 
  (0,0941)  (0,1818)  (0,0721) 
( ) z lˆ   -4,9936 **  -5,2360 **  -5,1552 ** 
  (0,1117)  (0,2599)  (0,1205) 
Number of obs.  108.897  21.526  95.707 
Censored obs.  20.292  8.454  44.616 
Log likelihood  -363.403,5  -57.265,63  -230.780,8 
Note: Standard errors in brackets; ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. Source: Authors’ estimates. 
                                                       
52 The procedure to impute these values in the 2003 database is described in Appendix C.   47 
Table B.4: Results of reservation wages – L1 to L5 factors 
  Benefits of 2003  Benefits shocks of 2005 
   Coefficients  S.E.  Coefficients  S.E. 
Wage regression equation:  i w log        
log B  -0,1176 **  (0,0040)  -0,1133 **  (0,0034) 
log Q  -0,0029 *  (0,0009)  -0,0034 **  (0,0009) 
Educ  0,1039 **  (0,0006)  0,1035 **  (0,0006) 
Age  0,0876 **  (0,0011)  0,0871 **  (0,0010) 
age
2  -0,0009 **  (0,0000)  -0,0009 **  (0,0000) 
Constant  3,4343 **  (0,0198)  3,4477 **  (0,0197) 
Selection equation:  ( ) z | 1 Pr = i S      
log B  0,0241 *  (0,0079)  0,0150 *  (0,0068) 
log Q  0,0021  (0,0020)  0,0017  (0,0021) 
Educ  0,0204 **  (0,0013)  0,0203 **  (0,0013) 
Age  0,0346 **  (0,0022)  0,0349 **  (0,0022) 
age
2  -0,0003 **  (0,0000)  -0,0003 **  (0,0000) 
Famsize  -0,0365 **  (0,0033)  -0,0348 **  (0,0033) 
Dg = 2 (Women w/ children)  -0,5199 **  (0,0102)  -0,5116 **  (0,0103) 
Dg = 3 (Others women)  -0,3597 **  (0,0089)  -0,2981 **  (0,0029) 
Da  0,2561 **  (0,0220)  0,2556 **  (0,0220) 
Constant  0,8714 **  (0,0522)  0,8531 **  (0,0521) 
( ) z l ˆ   -0,5581 **  (0,0053)  -0,5549 **  (0,0053) 
Number of obs.  103.289    103.289   
Censored obs.  10.867    10.867   
Log likelihood  -128.537,9    -126.387,7   
Note: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. Source: Authors’ estimates. 
B.4. Labor Supply Elasticities 
In this section we evaluate the relations between the conditional cash transfer programs and the 
individual work decision through the substitution and income effects. In table B.5 we present the 
marginal effects in respect to hours of work, implied by the estimates in table B.3 as presented in 
this Appendix.  
The wage compensated elasticity of labor supply reflects the strength of the substitution effect 
from the perspective of labor income. The wage elasticities are the coefficients reported by the 
variable  w log  in equation (3.2.1). For women without children (j = 3) this elasticity is positive and 
higher than for women head of families (j = 2),which is to be expected and according to the results 
of  many  empirical  studies.  For  men,  the  negative  elasticity  is  not  usual,  but  its  result  is  non-
significant.    48 
The magnitude of the income effect is reflected in the income elasticity of labor supply. These 
income elasticities - described by the variables  B log  (public transfer benefits) and  Q log  (all other 
non labor income) in equation (3.2.1) - are all negative, as expected. The highest sensibility is 
related to the group formed by women head of households with children which is in line with the 
great majority of the empirical work on this subject. Also, the results are consistent with the standard 
theory and show that the cash benefits may have participation effects on the specific population 
groups. 
Table B.5: Elasticities - Marginal effects for grouping demographics 
Variable 
j = 1 (Men)  j = 2 (Women with children)  j = 3 (Women) 
Elasticity  S.E.  Elasticity  S.E.  Elasticity  S.E. 
Wage elasticity (log w)  -0,0230   (0,0506)  0,0328 **  (0,0070)  0,1168 **  (0,0047) 
Income elasticicity (log B)  -0,0009  (0,0010)  -0,0128 **  (0,0014)  -0,0082 **  (0,0008) 
Income elasticity (log Q)  -0,0026 **  (0,0002)  -0,0041 **  (0,0006)  -0,0028 **  (0,0004) 
Note: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Appendix C: The methodology to assign the 2005 benefits 
Here, the methodology adopted to assign the 2005 BF and BPC benefits in the 2003 household 
survey  is  discussed,  which  were  used  in  the  simulations  described  at section  4. The simulated 
shocks represent the situation where the 2005 benefits (values and profiles) were applied to the 
2003 economy to check their economic impacts, mainly on poverty and income distribution. 
Two  main  problems  arise  from  this  assigned  process.  The  first  problem  is  the  comparison 
between the benefits amount and values identified in the two household surveys database with 
government data. The benefits of the 2003 and 2005 PNAD data were firstly identified by Barros et 
al  (2007)  and  they  do  not  show  the  complete  universe  of  beneficiaries  of  government’s 
administrative data. Table C.1 compares the 2003/2005 benefits between the household surveys 
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Table C.1: Comparison between the transfer program data 
Programs 









(1)/(2) in % 
Bolsa Família                   
Amounts (in 
R$ millions)  2.283,50  3.185,00  39,48%  4.226,13  6.871,36  62,59% 
Number of 
Beneficiated 
Families  5.173.051  8.106.163  56,70%  6.495.157  10.592.024  63,08% 
BPC                   
Amounts (in 
R$ millions)  804,97  5.132,93  537,66%  4.201,55  7.838,64  86,57% 
Number of 
Beneficiaries  279.503  2.312.711  727,44%  1.167.097  2.277.365  95,13% 
Source: PNAD 2003, 2005 (IBGE) e IPEA. 
We can realize from the above table that the survey numbers (PNAD) are always smaller than 
the administrative data. The major discrepancies are in the year 2003, particularly for BCP. This fact 
suggests an identification problem in the 2003 survey. 
The second main problem is the identification of new beneficiaries in the 2003 survey, which 
should  be  the  equivalent  to the  2005  beneficiaries. This question  is  amplified  by  the  significant 
differences pointed out in the table which could lead to two other problems: the identification of the 
new beneficiaries who do not comply with program rules and the identification of a new number of 
benefits that would not represent the programs’ real evolution between those years. 
The solution adopted for these problems was to create two different assigned rules, one for BF 
and another for BPC, which are described separately bellow. 
C.1. The Bolsa Família Benefits Allocation  
In table C.1, according to the government registers, the benefited families increased by 30.7 
percent and the total expenditure by 115.7 percent, between 2003 and 2005. The higher increment 
in the amounts was also due to the changes in basic benefits. In this case, the solution for the 
benefits assignment was the implementation of a new number of beneficiaries which would follow 
the same programs evolution capture in the household surveys. 
This task was facilitated by the fact that the PNAD 2003 surveys present a variable that allows a 
new set of potential Bolsa Família beneficiaries. With this information, it was possible to identify 
1,619,507 new beneficiaries, totaling 6,792,558 families in 2005, representing a 31.3 percent growth 
in the number of beneficiaries. For comparison, the number of identifications in the PNAD 2005 was 
6,495,157  families,  resulting  in  a  difference  of  just  5  percent  between  the  imputation  and  the 
identification. In this case, the payment amounts increase by 90.6 percent. This percentage was   50 
inferior to the 115.7 percent of the administrative data between 2003 e 2005, but it is important to 
remember that our task at the household level is replicate the 2005 survey and not the registers. 
C.2. The 2005 BPC Imputed Benefits  
As pointed out before, identification of BPC beneficiaries in PNAD 2003 was very precarious as 
compared with their identification in PNAD 2005. Analyzing the beneficiaries profile during that year 
suggests that the identification problem was mainly due to the spread of this benefit to not just one 
variable in the 2003 survey but to others i.e., the variables that identify the personal income related 
with social security benefits (retirements, pensions, etc). In this way, the benefits were captured in 
the survey but were not separately identified by Barros et al (2007). 
One way to circumvent this problem is to rely on the data provided by government. According to 
table C.1, the growth in BPC beneficiaries was 33.9 percent, while the growth in the amount of 
benefits  amount  was  52.7  percent.  On  the  other  hand,  table  C.2  shows  that  this  increase  was 
mainly among the benefits for the elderly compared with benefits for the disabled (approximately 
60% and 17%, respectively). In view of this, we adopted a strategy that could identify the possible 
candidates for the BPC’s aged benefits, following the program’s rules. 
Table C.2: Expenditure and number of BPC benefits (2003 – 2005) 
Programs 
2003  2005  Variation (%) 
Year Amount 
(R$ mi)  Beneficiaries  Year Amount 
(R$ mi)  Beneficiaries  Year Amount 
(R$ mi)  Beneficiaries 
BPC (aged)  1.972,45  664.875  3.614,93  1.065.604  183,3%  60,3% 
BPC (disable)  3.160,49  1.036.365  4.223,71  1.211.761  133,6%  16,9% 
Total  5.132,93  1.701.240  7.838,64  2.277.365  152,7%  33,9% 
Source: Government Administrative Registers 
In order to minimize the identification error of BPCs, we opted for the following procedure:  
Step  1:  Identify  all  aged  individuals  (65  years  or  more)  which  did  not  have  pensions  or 
retirement benefits. 
Step  2:  Choose  individuals  from  step  1  whose  family  per  capita  income  is  less  than  1 
minimum wage. 
Step 3: Allocate one 1 minimum wage (2003) BPC benefit to all selected individuals in the 
former step. 
This procedure resulted in identifying 570,314 individuals who could receive the BPC. In this 
way, the methodology reasonably captures the administrative programs situation showed in table 
C.2.  Contrary  to  the  imputation  process  of  BF,  the  BPC  process  must  be  compared  with  the 
administrative increase due to the identification problems of these benefits in the base year 2003.   51 




Integrates the program “Fome Zero” (Hunger Zero), which aims to assure the human right to 
adequate  feeding,  promoting  the  alimentary  and  nutritional  security  and  contributing  to  the 
eradication of extreme poverty among the most vulnerable segments of the population.  
D.1.2. Program Rules 
D.1.2.1. Conditions of access 
·  Families with incomes of up to R$ 60.00 (USD 26.09) per person; 
·  Families with incomes of R$ 60.01 (USD 26.10) to R$ 120.00 (USD 52.17) per person, 
with children from 0 to 15 years. 
D.1.2.2. Concession of benefits 
Classified into two types according to family composition: 
·  Basic: the value of R$ 62.00 (USD 26.96), granted to families with monthly income of 
up to R$ 60.00 (USD 26.09) per person, regardless of family composition;  
·  Variable: the value of R$ 20.00 (USD 8.69) for each child or teenager up to 15 years or 
within the limit R$ 60.00 (USD 26.09), equivalent to three children per family. 
The Bolsa Família program eligibility criteria are demonstrated in table D.1. 
Table D.1: Bolsa Família eligibility criteria 
Eligibility Criteria  Occurence of children / 
teenagers 0-15 years old, 
pregnant and breast-feeding 
Quantity and Type of 
Benefits 
Benefit Values 
(R$)  Family Situation  Per capita Monthly 
Income 
Poverty Situation  From R$ 60,01 
to R$ 120,00 
1 member  (1) Variable  20,00  
2 members  (2) Variable  40,00  
3 or more members  (3) Variable  60,00  
Extreme Poverty 
Situation  Up to R$ 60,00  
No Occurence  basic  62,00  
1 Member  Basic + (1) Variable  82,00  
2 Members  Basic + (2) Variables  102,00  
3 or more members  Basic + (3) Variables  122,00  
                                                       
53 All program sources can be checked with the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Combat, Brasilia-
DF; IPEA (2004): Bulletin of Social Policies - Monitoring and Analysis, Nº 9, IPEA, Brasilia-DF; IPEA (2007): 
Bulletin  of  Social  Policies  -  Monitoring  and  Analysis,  special  edition  Nº  13;  Bulletin  of  Social  Policies  - 
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There  is  also  the  Variable  Benefit  of  Extraordinary  Character  (VBEC)  that  is  granted  to  the 
families of remaining programs ( these are Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Food Card and Gas 
Assistance Programs) whose migration to the BF program caused financial losses to the family. In 
these cases, the amount granted is calculated case by case and has a limitation period, beyond 
which it will no longer be paid under the Ordinance MDS / GM nº 737, of 15/12/2004. 
D.1.3. Recent Expansion  
Since March 17, 2008 the program has started to attend to teenagers from families who already 
received the benefit. Each family attended to by the program started receiving up to two benefits of 
R$ 30 (USD 13.04) for children between 15 and 17 years (maximum of R$ 60, or USD 26.09 per 
family;  the  current  exchange  rate  is  R$  2.3  =  1  USD).  The  ministry  estimates  that  1.7  million 
teenagers in this age group should get the benefit. Only young people who commit to attend 75 
percent of classes each month are entitled to this extension. The families then add this value to the 
resources already passed to them by the Bolsa Família; that is, this new benefit is cumulative to the 
previous one. 
D.1.4. Conditionalities 
D.1.4.1. Health (Ordinance MS / MDS nº 2509 of November 18, 2004) 
For families with children up to 7 years:  
·  Take the kids to vaccination and stay up to date with the vaccination schedule;  
·  Take the kids to be weighed, measured, and examined according to the timetable of 
the Ministry of Health. 
·  For pregnant women and mothers who are breast-feeding:  
·  Participate of prenatal care;  
·  Continue  the monitoring  after the  birth  according to the timetable  of the  Ministry  of 
Health and always caring the Pregnant's card with;  
·  Participate in educational activities developed by health teams on breastfeeding and 
healthy feeding. 
D.1.4.2. Education (Ordinance MEC / MDS nº 3789 of November 17, 2004): 
·  Enroll children and teenagers aged 6 to 15 years in school;  
·  Ensure  their  attendance  in  at  least  85  percent  of  the  classes  each  month.  The 
absences need to be notified with the school and the reasons need to be explained;    53 
·  Inform the local manager of the Bolsa Família program whenever a child moves to 
another  school,  so  that  the  local  public  servant  can  continue  to  monitor  the  school 
attendance. 
D.1.5. Financing 
In January 2004, the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Combat (MDS) was created to 
follow through on the national policies of social assistance, food security and income transfer. The 
MDS  took  under  its  responsibility  the  management  of  two  funds  within  the  federal  budget,  the 
National  Fund  of  Combat  and  Eradication  of  Poverty  (FCEP)  and  the  National  Fund  of  Social 
Welfare,  which  embraces,  among  others,  the  Manager  Council  of  the  Bolsa  Família  program. 
Currently, the FCEP provides almost all the financial sources to the Bolsa Família program. 
Table D.2 shows the taxes that finance the program. We can see that 76 percent of the program 
was funded by the Provisory Contribution over Financial Movements (CPMF), which was the main 
source of FCEP’s funds. The second largest source comes from the Ordinary Resources, which 
includes various taxes but is mainly comprised of the tax on corporations’ income, taxes on labor 
income and capital gains retained at source, and the import tax. The rest of the funding is from the 
Contribution over Corporations’ Net Profits (CSLL-PJ), the Contribution for Social Security Funding 
(COFINS), and a small part from the external credit operations. 
Table D.2: Program financing (1335) – income transfer with conditionalities, 2005 
Code – Source  Value  Composition 
155 – Provisory Contribution Over Financial Movements (CPMF)  5.021.407.702  76,13% 
300 - Ordinary Resources  858.502.089  13,02% 
151 - Contribution over Corporations’ Net Profits (CSLL)  360.361.798  5,46% 
153 - Contribution for Social Security Funding (COFINS)  340.056.460  5,16% 
148 - External credit operations - in currency  15.100.000  0,23% 
Total  6.595.428.049  100,00% 
Source: Federal Senate, Budget Council, own elaboration under solicitation of Senator Eduardo Suplicy's cabinet 
D.1.6. Evolution in the number of beneficiaries and in expenditures 
The  Bolsa  Família  program  was  established  in  2004,  unifying  the  previous  programs  Bolsa 
Escola, Bolsa Alimentação and Food Card, which in 2003 was managed by the Active Community 
Program. Table D.3 shows that the program grew by 128 percent over a five-year period. From 
2003 to 2006 the growth was 36 percent, reaching more than 11 million families. The table also 
shows that the other programs have decreased their number of beneficiaries, being only remnants 
of Bolsa Família. 
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Table D.3: Number of Bolsa Família beneficiary families 
Programs  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Bolsa Escola  4.794.405  5.106.509  3.771.199  3.042.794  1.783.874  36.481 
Bolsa Alimentação  30.137  966.553  369.463  53.507  24.175  2.474 
Food Card       349.905  107.907  83.524  32.136 
Bolsa Família       3.615.596  6.571.842  8.700.451  10.965.810 
Total  4.824.542  6.073.062  8.106.163  9.776.050  10.592.024  11.036.901 
Source: IPEA - BPS nº 13 (2001-02); BPS nº15 (2003-06) 
As for the expenditure, one can see a growth of $ 5,046,021,853 (158%) in three years, with the 
greatest growth occurring in the year of unification (2004) followed by a constant rate of growth of 
16 percent in the succeeding years. 
Table D.4: Bolsa Família  expenditure (in R$) 
Program  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Bolsa Família   3.185.000.000*  5.917.079.972  6.871.361.925  8.231.021.853 
Source: IPEA - BPS nº13 (2001-04) (deflated by IPCA of 2005); BPS nº 14 (2005-06) (deflated by IPCA of 2006). 
* Includes the programs Bolsa Escola, Healthy Feeding and Active Community; source: BPS nº9 (in prices of 2004, com deflator of 
5,91%). 
D.1.7. Specific Legal and Administrative Information 
D.1.7.1. Regulation 
Law 10836 of 09 January 2004 and  Decree nº 5749 of April 11, 2006. The Law nº 10.836 
establishing the Bolsa Família program can be viewed in full at: 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/lei/l10.836.htm. 
D.1.7.2. Documentation 
If the family fits the conditions defined by the program, it should coordinate with the person 
responsible  for  the  Bolsa  Família  program  in  the  city  where  the  family  resides.  The  potential 
beneficiary should be ready with its personal documents (such as a voter title or CPF) to register in 
the Unified Register of the Federal Government Social Programs. 
D.1.7.3. Operational Model 
The municipality is responsible for operating the program. However,  registration in the program 
does not mean the immediate entry of these families or the receipt of the benefit. Each city has an 
estimated number of poor families regarded as the attending goal of the program in that specific 
territory.  Based  on  the  information  entered  into  the  Unified  Register,  the  Ministry  of  Social 
Development and Hunger Combat (MDS) selects the families that will be included in the Program 
each month using automated processes. 
D.1.7.3.1. From the Federal Government 
The  Federal  Government  through  the  Ministry  of  Social  Development  and  Hunger  Combat, 
manages the Bolsa Família program. The inclusion of families in the program is managed by the   55 
National Office of Income and Citizenship (SENARC), which oversees the concession of the benefit. 
The responsibilities of SENARC are: 
·  Drawing up rules and regulations of the BF;  
·  Managing the Unified Register of Social Programs;  
·  Monitoring the local management of BF;  
·  Promoting improvements and encouraging the use of Benefits Management System by 
the municipal administrators, state coordinators, members of Boards of Social Control and 
members  of  the  Network  for  Surveillance  of  the  Bolsa  Família  program,  aimed  at  the 
efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of benefits management actions;  
·  Promoting the exchange of good practices among municipal managers of the program 
and its dissemination at the national level;  
·  Carrying out activities for the administration of benefits;  
·  Building capacities among officials responsible for benefit management and members 
responsible social control, in partnership with other federal entities. 
D.1.7.3.2. Responsibilities of the Municipalities 
·  Periodically  check  if  the  families  of  the  BF  and  other  programs  meet  the  eligibility 
criteria, using statistical sampling techniques in order to match the financial benefits to 
the real conditions of families;  
·  Register officials from the city hall and members of the municipal instance of social 
control with SIBEC and empower these users;  
 
·  Meet  the  requirements  for  information  and  clarification  from  the  Public  Surveillance 
Network; 
·   Disclose information on the benefits of BF and other programs to other local public 
agencies and  civil society organizations;  
·  Keep SENARC informed about cases of irregularities or deficiencies identified in the 
provision of services by responsible Operator Agents or its local registered network 
(banking correspondent, lottery agents etc.).   56 
D.2. Benefit of Continued Installment - BPC
54 
D.2.1. General Information  
Continued  installment  consists  of  a  monthly  payment  equivalent  to  one  minimum  wage  for 
people 65 years of age or older and the disabled, both of whom work and live independently. In both 
cases  the  per  capita family  income  must  be  less  than ¼  of the minimum  wage. The  benefit  is 
administered by the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Combat (MDS), which includes its 
management, monitoring, and evaluation. In turn, its operation is under the responsibility of the 
National Social Security Institute (INSS). Resources for costing the BPC come from the National 
Fund of Social Welfare (FNAS). 
The eligible person requests the benefit through social security. It is necessary to prove income 
of less than 1/4 of the minimum monthly wage per person in the family, to show the minimum age of 
65 years in the case of elderly people, and to have the beneficiary’s disabling condition certified by 
medical specialists of the INSS (in the case of people with disabilities). It is not necessary that the 
applicant has social security contributions. 
The Lifelong Monthly Income (RMV) is a similar benefit established in 1974 but was replaced by 
the BPC in 1993 through the Organic Law of Social Welfare (LOAS). The RMV benefits are paid as 
a remaining benefit. 
In these programs the gross monthly family income is defined as the sum of monthly gross 
income  earned  by  family  members  including  wages,  profits,  pensions,  food,  public  and  private 
welfare benefits, commissions, pro-labor, other income from non-rewarded work, income from the 
informal market or self-employment, earned income from property, Lifelong Monthly Income and 
Benefit of Continued Installment, except when it applies to the BPC granted to another elderly in the 
family, according to Article 34 of Law 10.741 of October 1, 2003 (also called the Statute of the 
Elderly). 
D.2.1.1. Legislation 
BPC was created by 1988 Constitution and is also supported by Law 10.741 of October 1 2003 
that introduced the Estatuto do Idoso. The benefit is part of SUAS (Sistema Único de Assistência 
Social), which is a new decentralized system for managing social benefits and was created by the 
LOAS (Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social, nº 8.742, of December 7, 1993). 
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D.2.1.2. Beneficiaries and Expenditure Evolution 
Table D.5 shows that the number of BPC beneficiaries had grown by 916.635 individuals, an 
increase of 58.65 percent from 2002 to 2006. It is important to note that although the number of 
beneficiaries with disabilities is larger in absolute terms, the growth is due more to the growing 
number of elderly beneficiaries, reflecting the aging of the population during the period. 
The Lifelong Monthly Income benefit decreases every year, since it is a benefit that is remaining 
in the process of replacement by the BPC. 
Table D.5: Number of BPC beneficiaries 
Programs  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
BPC issued to elderly  584.597  664.875  933.164  1.065.604  1.183.840 
BPC issued to disabled people  976.257  1.036.365  1.127.849  1.211.761  1.293.645 
sub-total BPC  1.562.856  1.703.243  2.063.017  2.279.370  2.479.491 
RMV issued to elderly  *  208.297  181.014  157.860  135.603 
RMV issued to disabled people  *  403.174  370.079  340.715  310.806 
TOTAL  1.562.856  2.312.711  2.612.106  2.775.940  2.923.894 
Source: IPEA - BPS nº 12 (2003-04); BPS nº 14 (2005-06). 
* Data not available 
Regarding the evolution of program spending, there is an increase of 175.43 percent from 2001 
to 2006, representing approximately R$ 6.190.182.160. As the value of the benefit is pegged to the 
minimum  wage,  even  the  RMV  (which  dropped  in  attendance  in  the  period)  shows  positive 
increments of spending in most years. Again, the biggest growth is due to the BPC issued to the 
elderly, which increased to R$ 3.399.377.329 (281.67%) in the period. 
Table D.6: BPC expenditure (in R$) 
Programs  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
BPC issued to elderly  1.206.868.227  1.672.606.907  1.972.447.737  2.595.763.442  3.614.931.846  4.606.245.556 
BPC issued to disabled people  2.321.737.199  2.953.111.905  3.160.486.871  3.526.909.333  4.223.706.476  5.112.542.025 
sub-total BPC  3.528.607.427  4.625.720.814  5.132.936.611  6.122.674.779  7.838.640.327  9.718.789.587 
RMV issued to elderly  *  *  *  645.113.156  604.723.319  591.798.567 
RMV issued to disabled people  *  *  *  1.327.892.680  1.271.076.861  1.316.567.069 
TOTAL  3.528.605.426  4.625.718.812  5.132.934.608  8.095.678.611  9.714.438.502  11.627.153.217 
Source: IPEA - BPS nº 13 (2001-04) (deflated by IPCA of 2005); BPS nº 14 (2005-06) (deflated by IPCA of 2006). 
* Data not available 
D.2.1.3. Financing 
Tables D.7 and D.8 show the BPC funding during the 2005 fiscal year, with data for budgetary 
disbursement in Real (R$) related to the benefits granted to the disabled and to the elderly, and the 
composition  of  such  funding.  In  both  cases,  the  COFINS  tax  is  the  biggest  source  of  program 
funding. In the BPC for the elderly however, Ordinary Resources represent more than it does in the 
case  of  the  BPC  to  disabled  people.  As  a  secondary  source  of  funding  however,  Ordinary 
Resources provide more for the BPC to the elderly than the disabled.   58 
Table D.7: Program financing (0065) for social protection to the disabled person, 2005 
Code – Source  Value  Composition 
153 - Contribution for Social Security Funding (COFINS)  3.799.835.045  94,20% 
300 - Ordinary Resources  233.833.395  5,80% 
151 - Contribution over Corporations’ Net Profits (CSLL)  13.249.867  0,33% 
155 - Provisory Contribution Over Financial Movements (CPMF)  12.262.280  0,30% 
Total  4.033.668.439  100,00% 
Source: Federal Senate, Budget Council, own elaboration upon solicitation from Senator Eduardo Suplicy's cabinet 
Table D.8: Program financing (1282) for social protection to the eldery, 2005 
Code – Source  Valor  Composição 
153 - Contribution for Social Security Funding (COFINS)  3.036.672.326  87,24% 
300 - Ordinary Resources  400.487.719  11,51% 
151 - Contribution over Corporations’ Net Profits (CSLL)  22.693.119  0,65% 
155 - Provisory Contribution Over Financial Movements (CPMF)  21.001.672  0,60% 
Total  3.480.854.837  100,00% 
Source: Federal Senate, Budget Council, own elaboration upon solicitation from Senator Eduardo Suplicy's cabinet 